encountered? This can be answered by recourse to the transcendence of the world—a transcendence with an ecstatico-horizonal foundation.
If the 'subject' gets conceived ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is grounded in temporality, then one must say that the world is 'subjective'. But in that case, this 'subjective' world, as one that is temporally transcendent, is 'more Objective' than any possible 'Object'.
When Being-in-the-world is traced back to the ecstatico-horizonal unity of temporality, the existential-ontological possibility of this basic state of Dasein is made intelligible. At the same time it becomes plain that a, concrete working-out of the world-structure in general and its possible variations can be tackled only if the ontology of possible entities within-the-world is oriented securely enough by clarifying the idea of Being in general. If an Interpretation of this idea is to be possible, the temporality of Dasein must be exhibited beforehand; here our characterization of Being-in-the-world will be of service. [367]
¶ 70. The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characteristic of Dasein
Though the expression 'temporality' does not signify what one understands by "time" when one talks about 'space and time', nevertheless spatiality seems to make up another basic attribute of Dasein corresponding to temporality. Thus with Dasein's spatiality, existential-temporal analysis seems to come to a limit, so that this entity which we call "Dasein", must be considered as 'temporal' 'and also' as spatial coordinately. Has our existential-temporal analysis of Dasein thus been brought to a halt by that phenomenon with which we have become acquainted as the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, and which we have pointed out as belonging to Being-in-the-world?xxv
If in the course of our existential Interpretation we were to talk about Dasein's having a 'spatio-temporal' character, we could not mean that this entity is present-at-hand 'in space and also in time'; this needs no further discussion. Temporality is the meaning of the Being of care. Dasein's constitution and its ways to be are possible ontologically only on the basis of temporality, regardless of whether this entity occurs 'in time' or not. Hence Dasein's specific spatiality must be grounded in temporality. On the other hand, the demonstration that this spatiality is existentially possible only through temporality, cannot aim either at deducing space from time or at dissolving it into pure time. If Dasein's spatiality is 'embraced' by temporality in the sense of being existentially founded upon it, then this connection between them (which is to be clarified in what follows) is also different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense. To say that our empirical representations of what is present-at-hand