427 II. 5
Being and Time

it, form a unity ; and in this unity birth and death are 'connected' in a manner characteristic of Dasein. As care, Dasein is the 'between'.

In temporality, however, the constitutive totality of care has a possible basis for its unity. Accordingly it is within the horizon ofDasein's temporal constitution that we must approach the ontological clarification of the 'connectedness of life'—that is to say, the stretching-along, the movement, and the persistence which are specific for Dasein. The movement [Bewegtheit] [375] of existence is not the motion [Bewegung] of something present-at-hand. It is definable in terms of the way Dasein stretches along. The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its "historizing".1 The question of Dasein's 'connectedness' is the ontological problem of Dasein's historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicality.2

With the analysis of the specific movement and persistence which belong to Dasein's historizing, we come back in our investigation to the problem which we touched upon immediately before exposing temporality to view-the question of the constancy of the Self, which we defined as the "who" of Dasein.i Self-constancy3 is a way of Being of Dasein, and is therefore grounded in a specific temporalizing of temporality. The analysis of historizing will lead us face to face with the problems of a thematical investigation of temporalizing as such.

If the question of historicality leads us back to these 'sources', then the locus of the problem of history has already been decided. This locus is not to be sought in historiology as the science of history. Even if the problem of 'history' is treated in accordance with a theory of science, not only aiming at the 'epistemological' clarification of the historiological way of grasping things (Simmel) or at the logic with which the concepts of historiological presentation are formed (Rickert) , but doing so with an orientation towards 'the side of the object', then, as long as the question is formulated this way, history becomes in principle accessible only as the Object of a science. Thus the basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to any possible thematizing by historiology and underlies it, has been irretrievably put aside. How history can become a possible object for historiology is something that may be gathered only from the kind of Being

1 'Die spezifische Bewegtheit des erstreckten Sicherstreckens nennen wir das Geschehen des Daseins.' On 'Geschehen' see our note I, p. 41, H. 19 above.

2 On 'historicality' ('Geschichtlichkeit') see our note 2, p. 3 1 , H. 10 above.

3 'Selbst-standigkeit'. Here we follow the reading of the older editions in which the hyphen comes at the end of a line. In the newer editions the hyphen is omitted; but presumably Heidegger intends the same expanded spelling which we have already met on H. 322 and H. 332. See our notes ad loc.

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger