434 II. 5
Being and Time

problem: to what extent and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicality belong, as an essential constitutive state, to the subjectivity of the 'historical' subject?

74. The Basic Constitution of Historicality

Dasein factically has its 'history', and it can have something of the sort because the Being of this entity is constituted by historicality. We must now justify this thesis, with the aim of expounding the ontological problem of history as an existential one. The Being of Dasein has been defined as care. Care is grounded in temporality. Within the range of temporality, therefore, the kind of historizing which gives existence its definitely historical character, must be sought. Thus the Interpretation of Dasein's historicality will prove to be, at bottom, just a more concrete working out of temporality. We first revealed temporality with regard to that way of existing authentically which we characterized as anticipatory resoluteness. How far does this imply an authentic historizing of Dasein?

We have defined "resoluteness" as a projecting of oneself upon one's own Being-guilty-a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety.iv Resoluteness gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness.v In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-Being, and it does so in such a manner that it will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself, and to take it over wholly. The resolute taking over of one's factical 'there', signifies, at the same time, that the Situation is one which has been [383] resolved upon. In the existential analysis we cannot, in principle, discuss what Dasein factically resolves in any particular case. Our investigation excludes even the existential projection of the factical possibilities of existence. Nevertheless, we must ask whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself. One's anticipatory projection of oneself on that possibility of existence which is not to be outstripped-on death-guarantees only the totality and authenticity of one's resoluteness. But those possibilities of existence which have been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death. And this is still less the case when one's anticipation of this possibility does not signify that one is speculating about it, but signifies precisely that one is coming back to one's factical "there". Will taking over the thrownness of the Self into its world perhaps disclose an horizon from which existence snatches its factical possibilities away?1 Have we not said in addition that Dasein never comes back behind its thrownness?vi Before we decide too quickly

1 'Soil etwa die Übernahme der Geworfenheit des Selbst in seine Welt einen Horizont erschliessen, dem die Existenz ihre faktischen Möglichkeiten entreisst?'