actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a reciprocative rejoinder to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a moment of vision; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the "today", is working itself out as the 'past'.1 Repetition does not abandon itself to that which is past, nor does it aim at progress. In the moment of vision authentic existence is indifferent to both these alternatives.
We characterize repetition as a mode of that resoluteness which hands itself down-the mode by which Dasein exists explicitly as fate. But if fate constitutes the primordial historicality of Dasein, then history has its essential importance neither in what is past nor in the "today" and its 'connection' with what is past, but in that authentic historizing of existence which arises from Dasein's future. As a way of Being for Dasein, history has its roots so essentially in the future that death, as that possibility of Dasein which we have already characterized, throws anticipatory existence back upon its factical thrownness, and so for the first time imparts to having-been its peculiarly privileged position in the historical. Authentic Being-towards-death-that is to say, the finitude of temporality-is the hidden basis of Dasein's historicality. Dasein does not first become historical in repetition; but because it is historical as temporal, it can take itself over in its history by repeating. For this, no historiology is as yet needed.
Resoluteness implies handing oneself down by anticipation to the "there" of the moment of vision; and this handing down we call "fate". This is also the ground for destiny, by which we understand Dasein's historizing in Being-with Others. In repetition, fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest. Historizing is itself grounded existentially in the fact that Dasein, as temporal, is open ecstatically; so too is the disclosedness which belongs to historizing, or rather so too is the way in which we make this disclosedness our own.
That which we have hitherto been characterizing as "historicality" to conform with the kind of historizing which lies in anticipatory resoluteness, we now designate as Dasein's "authentic historicality". From the phenomena of handing down and repeating, which are rooted in the
1 'Die Wiederholung lässt sich, einem entschlossenen Sichentwerfen entspringend, nicht vom "Vergangenen" überreden, urn es als das vormals Wirkliche nur wiederkehren zu lasse.1. Die Wiederholung erwidert vielmehr die Möglichkeit der dagewesenen Existenz. Die Erwiderung der Möglichkeit im Entschluss ist aber zugleich als augenblickliche der Widerruf dessen, was in Heute sich als "Vergangenheit" auswirkt.' The idea seems to be that in resolute repetition one is having, as it were, a conversation with the past, in which the past proposes certain possibilities for adoption, but in which one makes a rejoinder to this proposal by 'reciprocating' with the proposal of other possibilities as a sort of rebuke to the past, which one now disavows. (The punning treatment of 'wieder' and 'wider' is presumably intentional.)