pass'; and because of this, it is only then that there at last arises from the horizon of the understanding which belongs to inauthentic historicality, the question of how one is to establish a 'connectedness' of Dasein if one does so in the sense of 'Experiences' of a subject—Experiences which are 'also' present-at-hand. The possibility that this horizon for the question should be the dominant one is grounded in the irresoluteness which goes to make up the essence of the Self's in-constancy.
We have thus pointed out the source of the question of the 'connectedness' of Dasein in the sense of the unity with which Experiences are linked together between birth and death. At the same time, the origin of this question betrays that it is an inappropriate one if we are aiming at a primordial existential Interpretation of Dasein's totality of historizing. On the other hand, despite the predominance of this 'natural' horizon for such questions, it becomes explicable why Dasein's authentic historicality—fate and repetition—looks as if it, least of all, could supply the phenomenal basis for bringing into the shape of an ontologically grounded problem what is at bottom intended in the question of the 'connectedness' of life.
This question does not ask how Dasein gains such a unity of connectedness that the sequence of 'Experiences' which has ensued and is still ensuing can subsequently be linked together; it asks rather in which of its own kinds of Being Dasein loses itself in such a manner1 that it must, as it were, only subsequently pull itself together out of its dispersal, and think up for itself a unity in which that "together" is embraced. Our lostness in the "they" and in the world-historical has earlier been revealed as a fleeing in the face of death. Such fleeing makes manifest that Being-towards-death is a basic attribute of care. Anticipatory resoluteness brings this Being-towards-death into authentic existence. The historizing of this resoluteness, however, is the repetition of the heritage of possibilities by handing these down to oneself in anticipation; and we have Interpreted this historizing as authentic historicality. Is perhaps the whole of existence stretched along in this historicality in a way which is primordial and not lost, and which has no need of connectedness? The Self's resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction, is in itself a steadiness which has been stretched along—the steadiness with which Dasein as fate 'incorporates' into its existence  birth and death and their 'between', and holds them as thus 'incorporated', so that in such constancy Dasein is indeed in a moment of vision for what is world-historical in its current Situation.2 In the fateful repetition
1 '... verliert es sich so ...' The older editions have '... verliert des sich nicht so ...'
2 'Die Entschlossenheit des Selbst gegen die Unständigkeit der Zerstreuung ist in sich selbst die erstreckte Stätigkeit, in der das Dasein als Schicksal Geburt und Tod in ihr "Zwischen" in seine Existenz "einbezogen" halt, so zwar, dass es in solcher Ständigkeit augenblicklich ist fur das Welt-geschichtliche seiner jeweiligen Situation.' The noun 'Stätigkeit', which we here translate as 'steadiness', may mean either 'continuity' or 'refractoriness'. Heidegger may have both senses in mind. Cf. our note g, p. 475, H. 423 below.