of possibilities that have been, Dasein brings itself back 'immediately'—that is to say, in a way that is temporally ecstatical—to what already has been before it. But when its heritage is thus handed down to itself, its 'birth' is caught up into its existence in coming back from the possibility of death (the possibility which is not to be outstripped), if only so that this existence may accept the thrownness of its own "there" in a way which is more free from Illusion.1
Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self. As resoluteness which is ready for anxiety, this loyalty is at the same time a possible way of revering the sole authority which a free existing can have—of revering the repeatable possibilities of existence. Resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one were to suppose that it would be actual as 'Experience' only as long as the 'act' of resolving 'lasts'. In resoluteness lies the existentiell constancy which, by its very essence, has already anticipated [vorweggenommen] every possible moment of vision that may arise from it. As fate, resoluteness is freedom to give up some definite resolution, and to give it up in accordance with the demands of some possible Situation or other. The steadiness of.existence is not interrupted thereby but confirmed in the moment of vision. This steadiness is not first formed either through or by the adjoining of 'moments' one to another; but these arise from the temporality of that repetition which is futurally in the process-of-having-been—a temporality which has already been stretched along.
In inauthentic historicality, on the other hand, the way in which fate has been primordially stretched along has been hidden. With the inconstancy of the they-self Dasein makes present its 'today'. In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one. The "they" evades choice. Blind for possibilities, it cannot repeat what has been, but only retains and receives the 'actual• that is left over, the world-historical that has been, the leavings, and the information about them that is present-at-hand. Lost in the making present of the "today", it understands the 'past' in terms of the 'Present•. On the other hand, the temporality of authentic historicality, as the moment of vision of anticipatory repetition,
1 'Mit diesem Sichüberliefern des Erbes aber ist dann die "Geburt" im Zurückkommen aus der unüberholbaren Möglichkeit des Todes in die Existent eingeholt, damit diese freilich nur die Geworfenheit des eigenen Da illusionsfreier hinnehme.' Here as in H. 307 and perhaps in H. 302, Heidegger seems to be exploiting the double meaning of 'einholen' as 'to bring in' and 'to catch up with'. Dasein 'brings' its birth 'into' its existence by accepting its heritage of possibilities, and in this way it 'catches up with it'. Thus while death cannot be outstripped ('überholt'), birth can at least be 'caught up with' ('eingeholt').