which has not passed away and which belongs to the world that has-been-there.

Remains, monuments, and records that are still present-at-hand, are possible 'material' for the concrete disclosure of the Dasein which has-been-there. Such things can turn into historiological material only because, in accordance with their own kind of Being, they have a world-historical character. And they become such material only when they have been understood in advance with regard to their within-the-world-ness. The world that has already been projected is given a definite character by way of an Interpretation of the world-historical material we have 'received'. Our going back to 'the past' does not first get its start from the acquisition, sifting, and securing of such material; these activities presuppose historical Being towards the Dasein that has-been-there—that is to say, they presuppose the historicality of the historian's existence. This is the existential foundation for historiology as a science, even for its most trivial and 'mechanical' procedures.^xi

If historiology is rooted in historicality in this manner, then it is from here that we must determine what the object of historiology 'really' is. The delimitation of the primordial theme of historiology will have to be carried through in conformity with the character of authentic historicality and its disclosure of"what-has-been-there"—that is to say, in conformity with repetition as this disclosure. In repetition the Dasein which has-been-there is understood in its authentic possibility which has been. The 'birth' of historiology from authentic historicality therefore signifies that in taking as our primary theme the historiological object we are projecting the Dasein which has-been-there upon its ownmost possibility of existence. Is historiology thus to have the possible for its theme? Does not its whole 'meaning' point solely to the 'facts'—to how something has factually been?

But what does it signify to say that Dasein is 'factual'? If Dasein is 'really' actual only in existence, then its 'factuality' is constituted precisely by its resolute projection of itself upon a chosen potentiality-forBeing. But if so, that which authentically has-been-there 'factually' is the existentiell possibility in which fate, destiny, and world-history have been factically determined. Because in each case existence i s only as factically thrown, historiology will disclose the quiet force of the possible with greater penetration the more simply and the more concretely having-been-in-the-world is understood in terms of its possibility, and 'only' presented as such.

[395] If historiology, which itself arises from authentic historicality, reveals by repetition the Dasein which has-been-there and reveals it in its