447 II. 5
Being and Time

possibility, then historiology has already made manifest the 'universal' in the once-for-all. The question of whether the object of historiology is just to put once-for-all 'individual' events into a series, or whether it also has 'laws' as its objects, is one that is radically mistaken. The theme of historiology is neither that which has happened just once for all nor something universal that floats above it, but the possibility which has been factically existent.1 This possibility does not get repeated as such—that is to say, understood in an authentically historiological way—if it becomes perverted into the colourlessness of a supratemporal model. Only by historicality which is factical and authentic can the history of what has-been-there, as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factical existence—in other words, that it comes towards that existence in its futural character. The historicality of unhistoriological Dasein does not take its departure from the 'Present' and from what is 'actual' only today, in order to grope its way back from there to something that is past; and neither does historiology. Even historiological disclosure temporalizes itself in terms of the future. The 'selection' of what is to become a possible object for historiology has already been met with in the factical existentiell choice of Dasein's historicality, in which historiology first of all arises, and in which alone it is.

The historiological disclosure of the 'past' is based on fateful repetition, and is so far from 'subjective' that it alone guarantees the 'Objectivity' of historiology. For the Objectivity of a science is regulated primarily in terms of whether that science can confront us with the entity which belongs to it as its theme, and can bring it, uncovered in the primordiality of its Being, to our understanding. In no science are the 'universal validity' of standards and the claims to 'universality' which the "they" and its common sense demand, less possible as criteria of 'truth' than in authentic historiology.

Only because in each case the central theme of historiology is the possibility of existence which has-been-there, and because the latter exists factically in a way which is world-historical, can it demand of itself that it takes its orientation inexorably from the 'facts'. Accordingly this research as factical has many branches and takes for its object the history of equipment, of work, of culture, of the spirit, and of ideas. As handing itself down, history is, in itself, at the same time and in each case always in an interpretedness which belongs to it, and which has a history of its own; so for the most part it is only through traditional history that


1 'Weder das nur einmalig Geschehene noch ein darüber schwebendes Allgemeines ist ihr Thema, sondern die faktisch existent gewesene Möglichkeit.'


Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger