463 II. 6
Being and Time

the theoretical 'representation' of a Continuous stream of "nows", and if, on the other hand, the possible ways in which Dasein assigns itself time and allows itself time are to be conceived of as determined primarily in terms of how Dasein, in a manner corresponding to its current existence, 'has' its time.

In an earlier passage authentic and inauthentic existing have been characterized with regard to those modes of the temporalizing of temporality upon which such existing is founded. According to that characterization, the irresoluteness of inauthentic existence temporalizes itself in the mode of a making-present which does not await but forgets. He who is irresolute understands himself in terms of those very closest events and be-failings which he encounters in such a making-present and which thrust themselves upon him in varying ways. Busily losing himself in the object of his concern, he loses his time in it too. Hence his characteristic way of talking—'I have no time'. But just as he who exists inauthentically is constantly losing time and never 'has' any, the temporality of authentic existence remains distinctive in that such existence, in its resoluteness, never loses time and 'always has time'. For the temporality of resoluteness has, with relation to its Present, the character of a moment of vision. When such a moment makes the Situation authentically present, this making-present does not itself take the lead, but is held in that future which is in the process of having-been. One's existence in the moment of vision temporalizes itself as something that has been stretched along in a way which is fatefully whole in the sense of the authentic historical constancy of the Self. This kind of temporal existence has its time for what the Situation demands of it, and it has it 'constantly'. But resoluteness discloses the "there" in this way only as a Situation. So if he who is resolute encounters anything that has been disclosed, he can never do so in such a way as to lose his time on it irresolutely.

The "there" is disclosed in a way which is grounded in Dasein's own temporality as ecstatically stretched along, and with this disclosure a 'time' is allotted to Dasein; only because of this can Dasein, as factically thrown, 'take' its time and lose it.

As something disclosed, Dasein exists factically in the way of Being with Others. It maintains itself in an intelligibility which is public and average. When the 'now that ...' and the 'then when ...' have been interpreted and expressed in our everyday Being with one another, they will be understood in principle, even though their dating is unequivocal only within [411] certain limits. In the 'most intimate' Being-with-one-another of several people, they can say 'now' and say it 'together', though each of them gives a different date to the 'now' which he is saying: "now that this or that has come to pass ..." The 'now' which anyone expresses is always said in the publicness of Being-in-the-world with one another. Thus the time

Being and Time (M&R) by Martin Heidegger