iii. (H. 47) This Jahrbuch, vol. I, 2, 1913, and II, 1916; cf. especially pp. 242 ff.
iv. (H. 47) Ibid., II, p. 243·
v. (H. 47) Cf. Logos I, loc. cit.
vi. (H. 48) Ibid., p. 246.
vii. (H. 48) Genesis I, 26. ['And God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." '—Tr.]
viii. (H. 49) Calvin, Institutio I, XV, Section 8. ['Man's first condition was excellent because of these outstanding endowments: that reason, intelligence, prudence, judgment should suffice not only for the government of this earthly life, but that by them he might ascend beyond, even unto God and to eternal felicity.'—Tr.]
ix. (H. 49) Zwingli. Von der Klarheit des Wortes Gottes (Deutsche Schriften I, 56). ['Because man looks up to God and his Word, he indicates clearly that in his very Nature he is born somewhat closer to God, is something more after his stamp, that he has something that draws him to God-all this comes beyond a doubt from his having been created in God's image.'—Tr.]
x. (H. 50) But to disclose the a priori is not to make an 'a-prioristic' construction. Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. 'A-priorism' is the method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself. There is nothing constructivistic about it. But for this very reason a priori research requires that the phenomenal basis be properly prepared. The horizon which is closest to us, and which must be made ready for the analytic of Dasein, lies in its average everydayness.
xi. (H. 51) Ernst Cassirer has recently made the Dasein of myth a theme for philosophical Interpretation. (See his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, vol. II, Das mythische Denken, 1925.) In this study, clues of far-reaching importance are made available for ethnological research. From the standpoint of philosophical problematics it remains an open question whether the foundations of this Interpretation are sufficiently transparent—whether in particular the architectonics and the general systematic content of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason can provide a possible design for such a task, or whether a new and more primordial approach may not here be needed. That Cassirer himself sees the possibility of such a task is shown by his note on pp. 16 ff., where he alludes to the phenomenological horizons disclosed by Husserl. In a discussion between the author and Cassirer on the occasion of a lecture before the Hamburg section of the Kantgesellschaft in December 1g23 on 'Tasks and Pathways of Phenomenological Research', it was already apparent that we agreed in demanding an existential analytic such as was sketched in that lecture.
Division One, Chapter Two
i. (H. 54) Cf. Jakob Grimm, Kleinere Schriften, vol. VII, p. 247.
ii. (H. 56) Cf. Section 2g.
Division One, Chapter Three
i. (H. 72) The author may remark that this analysis of the environment and in general the 'hermeneutic of the facticity' of Dasein, have been presented repeatedly in his lectures since the winter semester of 1919-1920.
ii. (H. 77) Cf. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, I. Teil, this Yearbook [ Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung ] vol. I, Section 10 ff., as well as his Logische Untersuchungen, vol. I, Ch. 11. For the analysis of signs and signification see ibid., vol. II, I, Ch. 1.
iii. (H. 90) Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, I, Pr. 53· (Œuvres, ed. Adam and Tannery, vol. VIII, p. 25.) ['And though substance is indeed known by some attribute, yet for each substance there is pre-eminently one property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all the rest are referred.'—Tr.]
iv. (H. 90) Ibid. ['Indeed extension in length, breadth, and thickness constitutes the nature of corporeal substance.' The emphasis is Heidegger's.—Tr.]
v. (H. 90) Ibid. ['For everything else that can be ascribed to body presupposes extension.'—Tr.]
vi. (H. 90) Ibid., Pr. 64, p. 31. ['And one and the same body can be extended in many different ways while retaining the same quantity it had before; surely it can sometimes be greater in length and less in breadth or thickness, while later it may, on the contrary, be greater in breadth and less in length.'—Tr.]