with regard to its possibility and necessity in the ontic constitution of Dasein.
But since existence defines Dasein, the ontological analysis of this being always requires in advance a consideration of existentiality. However, we understand existentiality as the constitution of being of the being [Seienden] that exists. But the idea of being in general already lies in the idea of such a constitution of being. And thus the possibility of carrying out the analysis of Dasein depends upon the prior elaboration of the question of the meaning of being in general.
Sciences and disciplines are ways of being of Dasein in which Dasein also relates to beings that it need not itself be. But being in a world belongs essentially to Dasein. Thus the understanding of being that belongs to Dasein just as originally implies the understanding of something like "world" and the understanding of the being of beings accessible within the world. Ontologies which have beings unlike Dasein as their theme are accordingly founded and motivated in the ontic structure of Dasein itself. This structure includes in itself the determination of a pre-ontological understanding of being.
Thus fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can originate, must be sought in the existential analysis of Dasein.
Dasein accordingly takes priority in several ways over all other beings. The first priority is an antic one: this being is defined in its being by existence. The second priority is an ontological one: on the basis of its determination as existence Dasein is in itself "ontological." But just as originally Dasein possesses—in a manner constitutive of its understanding of existence—an understanding of the being of all beings unlike itself. Dasein therefore has its third priority as the ontic-ontological condition of the possibility of all ontologies. Dasein has proven itself to be that which, before all other beings, is ontologically the primary being to be interrogated.
However, the roots of the existential analysis, for their part, are ultimately existentiell; i.e. they are ontic. Only when philosophical research and inquiry themselves are grasped in an existentiell way-as a possibility of being of each existing Dasein—does it become possible at all to disclose the existentiality of existence and therewith to get hold [14] of a sufficiently grounded set of ontological problems. But with this the ontic priority of the question of being has also become clear.
The ontic-ontological priority of Dasein was already seen early on, without Dasein itself being grasped in its genuine ontological structure or even becoming a problem with such an aim. Aristotle says, ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πώς ἐστιν.6 The soul (of the human being) is in a certain way a
6. De anima ID.8.431b21; d. ID.5.430a14ff.