continually, and most closely related—the "world."* In Dasein itself [16] and therewith in its own understanding of being, as we shall show, the way the world is understood is ontologically reflected back upon the interpretation of Dasein.
The ontic-ontological priority of Dasein is therefore the reason why the specific constitution of the being of Dasein-understood in the sense of the "categorial" structure that belongs to it-remains hidden from it. Dasein is ontically "nearest" to itself, ontologically farthest away; but pre-ontologically certainly not foreign to itself.
We have merely precursorily indicated that an interpretation of this being is confronted with peculiar difficulties rooted in the mode of being of the thematic object and the way it is thematized. They do not result from some shortcoming of our powers of knowledge or lack of an appropriate conceptuality—a lack seemingly easy to remedy.
Not only does an understanding of being belong to Dasein, but this understanding also develops or decays according to the actual manner of being of Dasein at any given time; for this reason it has a wealth of interpretations at its disposal. Philosophical psychology, anthropology, ethics, "politics," poetry, biography, and historiography pursue in different ways and to varying extents the behavior, faculties, powers, possibilities, and destinies of Dasein. But the question remains whether these interpretations were carried out in as original an existential manner as their existentiell originality perhaps merited. The two do not necessarily go together, but they also do not exclude one another. Existentiell interpretation can require existential analysis, provided philosophical knowledge is understood in its possibility and necessity. Only when the fundamental structures of Dasein are adequately worked out with explicit orientation toward the problem of being will the previous results of the interpretation of Dasein receive their existential justification.
Hence the first concern in the question of being must be an analysis of Dasein. But then the problem of gaining and securing the kind of access that leads to Dasein truly becomes crucial. Expressed negatively, no arbitrary idea of being and reality, no matter how "self-evident" it is, may be brought to bear on this being in a dogmatically constructed way; no "categories" prescribed by such ideas may be forced upon Dasein without ontological deliberation. The manner of access and interpretation must instead be chosen in such a way that this being can show itself to itself on its own terms. And furthermore, this manner should show that being as it is initially and for the most part-in its average everydayness. Not arbitrary and accidental structures but [17] essential ones are to be demonstrated in this everydayness, structures
* i.e., here in terms of what is objectively present.