30 INT. II
Being and Time

term phenomenon (disregarcling other differences) can be illustrated when we say that what already shows itself in appearances, prior to and always accompanying what we commonly understand as phenomena (though unthematically), can be brought thematically to selfshowing. What thus shows itself in itself ("the forms of intuition") are the phenomena of phenomenology. For, clearly, space and time must be able to show themselves in this way. They must be able to become phenomena if Kant claims to make a valid transcendental statement when he says that space is the a priori "wherein" of an ordering.

B. The Concept of Logos

[32] The concept of λόγος has many meanings in Plato and Aristotle, indeed in such a way that these meanings diverge without a basic meaning positively taking the lead. This is in fact only an illusion which lasts so long as an interpretation is not able to grasp adequately the basic meaning in its primary content. If we say that the basic meaning of Myo􀃜 is discourse [Rede], this literal translation becomes valid only when we define what discourse itself means. The later history of the word Myo􀃝 and especially the manifold and arbitrary interpretations of subsequent philosophy, constantly conceal the authentic meaning of discourse—which is manifest enough. λόγος is "translated," and that always means interpreted, as reason, judgment, concept, definition, ground, relation. But how can "discourse" be so susceptible of modification that λόγος means all the things mentioned, and indeed in scholarly usage? Even if λόγος is understood in the sense of a statement, and statement as "judgment," this apparently correct translation can still miss the fundamental meaning—especially if judgment is understood in the sense of some contemporary "theory of judgment." λόγος does not mean judgment, in any case not primarily, if by judgment we understand "connecting two things" or "taking a position" (by endorsing or rejecting).

Rather, λόγος as discourse really means δηλοῦν, to make manifest "what is being talked about" in discourse. Aristotle explicates this function of discourse more precisely as ἀποφαίνεσθαι.4 λόγος lets something

4. Cf. De interpretatione, chaps. 1-6. See further, Metaphysics VII.4 and Nicomachean Ethics VII.

Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)