does not express its what—as in the case of table, house, tree—but rather being [Sein].*
2. The being [Sein] which this being [Seienden] is concerned about in its being [Sein] is always my own. Thus, Dasein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of beings objectively present. To something objectively present its being is a matter of "indifference," ["gleichgültig"], more precisely, it "is" in such a way that its being can neither be indifferent nor non-indifferent to it. In accordance with the character of always-being-my-own-being [Jemeinigkeit], when we speak of Dasein, we must always use the personal pronoun along with whatever we say: "I am," "you are."†
Dasein is my own, to be always in this or that way. It has somehow always already decided in which way Dasein is always my own. The being which is concerned in its being about its being is related to its being as its ownmost possibility. Dasein is always its possibility. It does not "have" that possibility only as a mere attribute of something objectively present. And because Dasein is always essentially its possibility, it can "choose" itself in its being, it can win itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only "apparently" win itself. It can only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself. The two [43] kinds of being [Seinsmodi] of authenticity [Eigentlichkeit] and inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]—these expressions are terminologically chosen in the strictest sense of the word—are based on the fact that Dasein is· in general determined by always being-mine. But the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify a "lesser" being or a "lower" degree of being. Rather, inauthenticity can determine Dasein even in its fullest concretion, when it is busy, excited, interested, and capable of pleasure.
The two characteristics of Dasein sketched out—on the one hand, the priority of "existentia" over essentia, and then, always-being-mine—already show that an analytic of this being is confronted with a unique phenomenal region. This being does not have and never has the kind of being of what is merely objectively present within the world. Thus, it is also not to be thematically found in the manner of coming across something objectively present. The correct presentation of it is so little a matter of course that its determination itself constitutes an essential part of the ontological analytic of this being. The possibility of understanding the being of this being stands and falls with the secure accomplishment of the correct presentation of this being. No matter how provisional the analysis may be, it always demands the securing of the correct beginning.
* The beyng [Seyn] 'of' the There, 'of': genitivus objectivus.
† That is, mineness [Jemeinigkeit] means being appropriated [Übereignetheit].