covered in terms of which beings can reveal themselves through touch and thus become accessible in their being present. Two beings, which are present within the world and are, moreover, worldless in themselves, can never "touch" each other, neither can they "be" "together with" one another. The supplement "which are moreover world.less" must not be left out, because those beings which are not world.less, for example Dasein itself, are present "in" the world, too. More precisely, they can be understood. within certain limits and with a certain justification as something merely present. To do this, one must completely disregard or just not see the existential constitution of being-in. But with this possible understanding of "Dasein" as something objectively present, and only objectively present, we may not attribute to Dasein its own kind of "objective presence." This objective presence does not become accessible by disregarding the specific structures of Dasein, but only in a previous understanding of them. Dasein understands its ownmost being in the [56] sense of a certain "factual objective presence."2 And yet the "factuality" of the fact of one's own Dasein is ontologically fundamentally different from the factual occurrence of a kind of stone. The factuality of the fact of Dasein, as the way in which every Dasein actually is, we call its facticity. The complicated structure of this determination of being is itself comprehensible as a problem only in the light of the existential fundamental constitutions of Dasein which we have already worked out. The concept of facticity implies that an "innerworldly" being has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its "destiny" with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world.
Initially it is only a matter of seeing the ontological distinction between being-in as an existential and the category of the "insideness" that things objectively present can have with regard to one another. If we define being-in in this way, we are not denying to Dasein every kind of "spatiality." On the contrary. Dasein itself has its own "being-in-space," which in its turn is possible only on the basis of being-in-the-world in general. Thus, being-in cannot be clarified ontologically by an ontic characteristic, by saying for example: being-in in a world is a spiritual quality and the "spatiality" of human being is an attribute of its bodiliness which is always at the same time "based on" corporeality. Here again we are faced with a being-objectively-present-together of a spiritual thing thus constituted with a corporeal thing, and the being of the beings thus compounded is more obscure than ever. The understanding of being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein first makes possible the insight into its existential spatiality. This insight will keep us from failing to see this structure or from previously cancelling
2. Cf. § 29.