61 I.II
Being and Time

such enigmas remains problematic unless one has first clarified how it is and what it is.

With this kind of approach one is blind to what was already implicitly implied in the preliminary thematization of the phenomenon of knowing. Knowing is a mode of being of Dasein as being-in-the-world, and has its ontic foundation in this constitution of being. But if, as we suggest, we thus find phenomenally that knowing is a kind of being of being-in-the-world, one might object that with such an interpretation of knowing, the problem of knowledge is annihilated. What is there left to ask about if one presupposes that knowing is already together with its world which it is, after all, first supposed to reach in the transcending of the subject? In this last question the "standpoint," which is not demonstrated phenomenally, once again emerges; but, apart from this, what criterion decides whether and in which sense there is to be a problem of knowledge other than that of the phenomenon of knowing itself and the kind of being of the knower?

If we now ask what shows itself in the phenomenal findings of knowing, we must remember that knowing itself is grounded beforehand in already-being-alongside-the-world, which essentially constitutes the being of Dasein. Initially, this already-being-alongside is not solely a rigid staring at something merely objectively present. Being-in-the-world, as taking care of things, is taken in by [benommen] the world which it takes care of. In order for knowing to be possible as determining by observation what is objectively present, there must first be a deficiency of having to do with the world and taking care of it. In refraining from all production, manipulation, and so on, taking care of things places itself in the only mode of being-in which is left over, in the mode of simply lingering with .... On the basis of this kind of being toward the world which lets us encounter beings within the world solely in their mere outward appearance (εἶδος), and, as a mode of this kind of being, looking explicitly at something thus encountered is possible.,. This looking at is always a way of assuming a definite direction toward something, a glimpse of what is objectively present. It takes over a "perspective" from the beings thus encountered from the very beginning. This looking itself becomes a mode of independent dwelling together with beings in the world. In this "dwelling" ["Aufenthalt"]—as refraining from every manipulation and use—the perception of what is objectively present takes place. Perception takes place as [62] addressing and discussing something as something. On the basis of this interpretation in the broadest sense, perception becomes definition. What


* Looking at does not occur merely by looking away. Looking at has its own origin and has looking away as its necessary 5onsequence. Observing [Betrachten] has its own primordiality. The look [Blick] to the εἶδος requires something different.


Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)