3. Again, world can be understood in an ontic sense, but not as beings essentially unlike Dasein that can be encountered within the world; but, rather, as that "in which" a factical Dasein 11lives" as Dasein. Here world has a pre-ontological, existentiell meaning. There are various possibilities here: world can mean the "public" world of the we or one's "own" and nearest (domestic) surrounding world.
4. Finally, world designates the ontological and existential concept of worldliness. Worldliness itself can be modified into the respective structural totality of particular "worlds," but contains in itself the a priori of worldliness in general. We shall reserve the expression world as a term for the meaning established in the third meaning of world. If we use it at times in the first meaning, we shall put it in quotation marks.
Thus, terminologically "worldly" means a kind of being of Dasein, never a kind of being of something objectively present "in" the world. We shall call the latter something belonging* to the world or innerworldly.
One look at previous ontology shows us that one skips over the phenomenon of worldliness when one fails to see the constitution of Dasein as being-in-the-world. Instead, one tries to interpret the world in terms of the being of the being which is present within the world but has not, however, even been initially discovered, that is, in terms of nature.† Ontologically and categorically understood, nature is a limit case of the being of possible innerworldly beings. Dasein can discover beings as nature in this sense only in a definite mode of its beingin- the-world. Thls kind of knowledge has the character of a certain "de-worlding" of the world. As the categorial content of structures of being of a definite being encountered in the world, "nature" can never render worldliness intelligible.‡ But even the phenomenon "nature," for instance in the sense of the Romantic concept of nature, is ontologically comprehensible only in terms of the concept of world; that is, in terms of an analytic of Dasein.
With regard to the problem of an ontological analysis of the worldliness of the world, traditional ontology is at a dead-end-if it sees the problem at all. On the other hand, an interpretation of the worldliness of Dasein and its possibilities and ways of becoming worldly, must show why Dasein skips over the phenomenon of worldliness ontically and ontologically in its way of knowing the world. But at the same [66]
* It is just Da-sein that obeys and listens to the world [welthörig].
† "Nature" intended here as Kantian in the sense of modem physics.
‡ Rather, the other way around!