§ 17. Reference [Verweisung] and Signs [Zeichen]
In our preliminary interpretation of the structure of being of things at hand ("useful things"), the phenomenon of reference became visible, but in such a sketchy fashion that, at the same time, we emphasized the necessity of uncovering the phenomenon merely indicated with regard to its ontological origin. Moreover, it became clear that reference and the referential totality were in some sense constitutive of worldliness itself. Until now we have seen the world lit up only in and for particular ways of taking care of what is at hand in the surrounding world, together with its handiness. Thus the further we penetrate into the understanding of the being of innerworldly beings, the broader and [77] more secure the phenomenal basis for the uncovering the phenomenon of world becomes.
We shall again take our point of departure with the being of what is at hand with the intention of grasping the phenomenon of reference more precisely. For this purpose we shall attempt an ontological analysis of the kind of useful thing in terms of which "references" can be found in a manifold sense. Such a "useful thing" can be found in signs. This word names many things. It names not only different kinds of signs, but being-a-sign-for something can itself be formalized to a universal kind of relation so that the sign structure itself yields an ontological guideline for "characterizing" any being whatsoever.
But signs are themselves initially useful things whose specific character as useful things consists of indicating [Zeigen]. Such signs are signposts, boundary-stones, the mariner's storm-buoy, signals, flags, signs of mourning, and the like. Indicating can be defined as a "kind" of referring. Taken in an extremely formal sense, to refer means to relate [Beziehen]. But relation does not function as the genus for "species" of reference which are differentiated as sign, symbol, expression, and signification. Relation is a formal definition which can be directly read off by way of "formalization" from every kind of context, whatever its subject matter or way of being.2
Every reference is a relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every "indicating" ["Zeigung"] is a reference, but not every reference is an indicating. This means that every "indicating" is a relation, but not every relation is an indicating. Thus the formal, universal character of relation becomes apparent. If we investigate such phenomena as reference, sign, or even signification, nothing is to be gained* by characterizing them as relations. Finally, we must even show that "rela-
* This is fundamental for demonstrating the possibility for the claim of logistics.
2. Cf. E. Husserl, Ideen, vol. 1, sect. lOff, and idem, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. 1, chapter 11. For the analysis of sign and signification, see ibid., vol. 2, first investigation.