117 I.IV
Being and Time

Dasein, absorbed in its world, does not address itself, but speaks away from itself, in circumspection, to the "over there" of something at hand and means, however, itself in its existential spatiality.

Dasein understands itself, initially and for the most part, in terms of its world, and the Dasein-with of others is frequently encountered from innerworldly things at hand. But when others become, so to speak, thematic in their Dasein, they are not encountered as objectively present thing-persons, rather we meet them "at work," that is, primarily in their being-in-the-world. Even when we see the other "just standing around," he is never understood as a human-thing objectively present. "Standing around" is an existential mode of being, the lingering with everything and nothing which lacks heedfulness and circumspection. The other is encountered in his Dasein-with in the world.

But, after all, the expression "Dasein" clearly shows that this being [Seiende] is "initially" unrelated to others, that it can, of course, also be "with" others subsequently. But we must not overlook the fact that we are also using the term Dasein-with as a designation of the being to which the existing others are freed within the world. The Dasein-with of others is disclosed only within the world, and so too for beings who are Daseins with us, because Dasein in itself is essentially being-with. The phenomenological statement that Dasein is essentially being-with has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not intend to ascertain ontically that I am factically not objectively present alone, rather that others of my kind also are [vorkommen]. If the statement that the being-in-the-world of Dasein is essentially constituted by being-with meant something like this, being-with would not be an existential attribute that belongs to Dasein of itself on the basis of its kind of being, but something which occurs at times on the basis of the existence of others. Being-with existentially determines Dasein even when an other is not factically present and perceived. The being-alone of Dasein, too, is being-with in the world. The other can be lacking only in and for a being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of being-with, its possibility is a proof for the latter. On the other hand, factical being alone is not changed by the fact that a second instance of a human being is "next to" me, or by ten such human beings. Even when these and still more are present, Dasein can be alone. Thus, being-with and the facticity of being-with-one-another are not based on the fact that several "subjects" are physically there together. Being alone "among" many, however, [121] does not mean with respect to the being of others that they are simply objectively present. Even in being "among them," they are there with [mit-da]. Their Dasein-with is encountered in the mode of indifference and being alien. Lacking and ''being away'' are modes of Dasein-with and are possible only because Dasein as being-with lets the Dasein of others be encountered in its world. Being-with is an attribute of one's


Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)