own Dasein. Dasein-with characterizes the Dasein of others in that it is freed for a being-with [Mitsein] by the world of that being-with .. Only because it has the essential structure of being-with, is one's own Dasein encounterable by others as Dasein-with.
If Being-with* remains existentially constitutive for being-in-the-world, it must be interpreted, as must also circumspect dealings with the innerworldly things at hand which we characterized by way of anticipation as taking care [Besorgen], in terms of the phenomenon of care [Sorge] which we used to designate the being of Dasein in general. (Cf. Chapter Six of this Division.) Taking care of things is a character of being which being-with cannot have as its own, although this kind of being is a being toward [Sein zu] beings encountered in the world, as is taking care of things. The being [Seiende] to which Dasein is related as being-with does not, however, have the kind of being of useful things at hand; it is itself Dasein. This being is not taken care of, but is a matter of concern [Fürsorge].
Even "taking care" of food and clothing, and the nursing of the sick body is concern. But we understand this expression in a way which corresponds to our use of taking care as a term for an existential. For example, "welfare work" [Fürsorge] as a factical social institution is based on the constitution of being of Dasein as being-with. Its factical urgency is motivated by the fact that Dasein initially and, for the most part, lives in the deficient modes of concern. Being for-, against-, and without-one-another, passing-one-another-by, not-mattering-to-one-another, are possible ways of concern. And precisely the last named modes of deficiency and indifference characterize the everyday and average being-with-one-another. These modes of being show the characteristics of inconspicuousness and obviousness which belong to everyday innerworldly Dasein-with of others, as well as to the handiness of useful things taken care of daily. These indifferent modes of being-with-one-another tend to mislead the ontological interpretation into initially interpreting this being as the pure objective presence of several subjects. It seems as if only negligible variations of the same kind of being lie before us, and yet ontologically there is an essential distinction between the "indifferent" being together of [122] arbitrary things and the not-mattering-to-one-another of beings who are with one another.
With regard to its positive modes, concern has two extreme possibilities. It can, so to speak, take the other's "care" away from him and put itself in his place in taking care, it can leap in for him. Concern takes over what is to be taken care of for the other. The other is thus displaced, he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has
* Earlier editions have Dasein-with here. Tr.