problem here. Its special hermeneutic will have to show how the various possibilities of being of Dasein themselves mislead and obstruct being-with-one-another and its self-knowledge, so that a genuine "understanding" is suppressed and Dasein takes refuge in surrogates; this positive existential condition presupposes a correct understanding of the stranger for its possibility. Our analysis has shown that being-with is an existential constituent of being-in-the-world. Dasein-with has proved to be a manner of being which beings encountered within the world have as their own. Insofar as Dasein is at all, it has the kind of being of being-with-one-another. Being-with-one-another cannot be understood as an accumulative result of the occurrence of multiple "subjects." Encountering a number of "subjects" itself is possible only by treating the others encountered in their Dasein-with merely as "numbers." Such numbers are discovered only by a distinctive being-with and being-toward-one-another. "Inconsiderate" being-with "reckons" with others without seriously "counting on them" or even wishing "to have anything to do" with them.
One's own Dasein, like the Dasein-with of others, is encountered initially and for the most part in terms of the surrounding world taken care of that is shared [Mitwelt]. In being absorbed in the world of taking care of things, that is, at the same time in being-with toward others, Dasein is not itself. Who is it, then, who has taken over being as everyday being-with-one-another? [126]
§ 27. Everyday Being a Self and the They
The ontologically relevant result of the foregoing analysis of being-with is the insight that the "subject character" of one's own Dasein and of the others is to be defined existentially, that is, in terms of certain ways to be. In what is taken care of in the surrounding world, others are encountered as what they are; they are what they do.
In taking care of the things which one has taken hold of, for, and against others, there is constant care as to the way one differs. from them, whether this difference is to be equalized, whether one's own Dasein has lagged behind others and wants to catch up in relation to them, whether Dasein in its priority over others is intent on suppressing them. Being-with-one-another is, unknown to itself, disquieted by the care about this distance. Existentially expressed, being-with-one-another has the character of distantiality. The more inconspicuous this kind of being is to everyday Dasein itself, all the more stubbornly and primordially does it work itself out.
But this distantiality which belongs to. being-with is such that, as everyday being-with-one-another, Dasein stands in subservience to others. It itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it. The everyday possibilities of being of Dasein are at the disposal of the