132 I. V
Being and Time

delivered over [Überantwortung]. The "that it is and has to be" disclosed in the athmement of Dasein is not the "that'' which expresses ontologically and categorially the factuality belonging to objective presence; the latter is accessible only when we ascertain it by looking at it. Rather, the that disclosed in attunement must be understood as an existential attribute of that being which is in the mode of being-in-the-world. Facticity is not the factuality of the factum brutum of something objectively present, but is a characteristic of the being of Dasein taken on in existence, although initially thrust aside. The that of facticity is never to be found by looking.

Beings of the character of Dasein are their there in such a way that they find themselves in their thrownness, whether explicitly or not. In attunement, Dasein is always already brought before. itself, it has always already found itself, not as perceiving oneself to be there, but as one finds one's self in attunement. As a being which is delivered over to its being, it is also delivered over to the fact that it must always already have found itself, found itself in a finding which comes not from a direct seeking, but from a fleeing. Mood does not disclose in the mode of looking at thrownness, but as turning toward and away from it. For the most part, mood does not turn itself toward the burdensome character of Dasein manifest in it, it does this least of all in an elevated mood in which this burden is lifted. This turning away is always what it is in the mode of attunement.

Phenomenally, what mood discloses and how it discloses would be completely misunderstood if what has been disclosed. were conflated with that which attuned Dasein "at the same time" is acquainted with, [136] knows, and believes. Even when Dasein is "sure" of its "whither" in faith or thinks it knows about its whence in rational enlightenment, all of this makes no difference in the face of the phenomenal fact that moods bring Dasein before the that of its there, which stares directly at it with the inexorability of an enigma: Existentially and ontologically there is not the slightest justification' for minimizing the "evidence" of attunement by measuring it against the apodictic certainty of the theoretical cognition of something merely objectively present. But the falsification of the phenomena, which banishes them to the sanctuary of the irrational, is no better. Irrationalism, as the counterpart of rationalism, talks about the things to which rationalism is blind, but only with a squint.

That a Dasein factically can, should, and must master its mood with knowledge and will may signify a priority of willing and cognition in certain possibilities of existing. But that must not mislead us into ontologically denying mood as a primordial kind of being of Dasein in which it is disclosed to itself before all cognition and willing and beyond their scope of disclosure. Moreover, we never master a mood by being free of a mood, but always through a counter mood. The first essential ontological characteristic of attunement is: attunement


Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)