pace," so that viewed publicly it is essentially slower, idle talk will have long since gone on' to something else which is currently even newer. That which had been surmised earlier, and has now been carried out, has come too late with regard to what is the very newest. In their ambiguity, curiosity and idle talk make sure that what is done in a genuine and new way is outdated as soon as it emerges before the public. Only then can reticence become free in its positive possibilities, when the idle talk covering it over has become ineffectual and the "common" interest has died out.
The ambiguity of the way things have been interpreted publicly passes off talking about things ahead of time and curious guessing as what is really happening, and it stamps carrying things out and taking action as something subsequent and of no importance. The understanding of Dasein in the they thus constantly goes astray in its projects with regard to the genuine possibilities of being. Dasein is always ambiguously "there," that is, in the public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most inventive curiosity keep the "business" going, where everything happens in an everyday way, and basically nothing happens at all.
Ambiguity is always tossing to curiosity what it seeks, and it gives to idle talk the illusion of having everything decided in it.
This kind .of being of the disclosedness of being-in-the-world, however, also dominates being-with-one-another as such. The other is initially "there" in terms of what they have heard about him, what they say and know about him. Idle talk initially intrudes itself into the [175] midst of primordial being-with-one-another. Everyone keeps track of the other, initially and first of all, watching how he will behave, what he will say to something. Being-with-one-another in the they is not at all a self-contained, indifferent side-by-sideness, but a tense, ambiguous keeping track of each other, a secretive, reciprocal listening-in. Under the mask of the for-one-another, the against-one-another is at play.
Here we must note that ambiguity does not first originate out of an explicit intention to dissimulate [Verstellung] and distort [Vercirehung], that it is not called forth by the individual Dasein. It is already implied in being-with-one-another, as thrown being-with-one-another in a world. But publicly it is quite concealed, and they will always protest the possibility that this interpretation of the kind of being of interpreting the they could be correct. It would be a misunderstanding if the explication of these phenomena were to seek to be confirmed by the approval of the they.
The phenomena of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity were set forth in such a way as to 'indicate that they are already interconnected in their being. The kind of being of this connection must now be grasped existentially and ontologically. The basic kind of being of