of analysis. The elaboration of this fundamental kind of attunement and the ontological characteristics of what is disclosed in it as such take their point of departure from the phenomenon of entanglement, and distinguish anxiety from the related phenomenon of fear analyzed earlier. As a possibility of being. of Dasein, together with the Dasein itself disclosed in it, anxiety provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping the primordial totality of being of Dasein. Its being reveals itself as care [Sorge]. The ontological development of this fundamental existential phenomenon demands that we differentiate it from phenomena which at first might seem to be identified with care. Such phenomena are will, wish, predilection, and urge. Care cannot be derived from them because they are themselves founded upon it.
Like any ontological analysis, the ontological interpretation of Dasein as care, with whatever can be gained from the interpretation, . is far removed from what is accessible to the pre-ontological understanding of being or even to our ontic acquaintance with beings. That the common understanding estranges what is known ontologically by referring it to that with which it is solely ontically acquainted is not surprising. Nonetheless, even the ontic approach with which we [183] have tried to interpret Dasein ontologically as care might appear to be contrived in a far-fetched and theoretical way; to say nothing of the violence which one could see in our exclusion of the traditional and approved definition of human being. Thus we need a pre-ontological confirmation of the existential interpretation of Dasein as care. This lies in demonstrating that as soon as Dasein expressed anything about itself, it had already interpreted itself as care (cura), even though it did so only pre-ontologically.
The analytic of Dasein, which penetrates to the phenomenon of care, is to prepare the way for the fundamental, ontological problematic, the question of the meaning of being in general. In order to direct our view explicitly to this in the light of what we have gained, and go beyond the special task of an existential, a priori anthropology, we must look back at the phenomena which are most intimately connected with the leading question of being in order to get a more penetrating grasp of them. These phenomena are the modes of being explained hitherto: handiness and objective presence which determine innerworldly beings unlike Dasein. Because the ontological problematic has hitherto understood being primarily in the sense of objective presence ("reality," "world"-actuality), while the being of Dasein remained ontologically undetermined, we need to discuss the ontological connection of care, worldliness, handiness, and objective presence (reality). That leads to a more exact determination of the concept of reality in the context of a discussion of the epistemological questions oriented toward this idea whicl1 have been raised by realism and idealism.