not signify that an objectively present "world" of objects is welded together with a subject. Rather, it is the phenomenal expression of the fact that the constitution of Dasein, whose wholeness is now delineated explicitly as being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in ..., is primordially a whole. Expressed differently: existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined by facticity.
Furthermore, the factical existing of Dasein is not only in general and indifferently a thmwn potentiality-for-being-in-the-world, but is always already also absorbed in the world taken care of. In this entangled being-together-with, fleeing from uncanniness (which mostly remains covered over by latent anxiety because the publicness of the they suppresses everything unfamiliar) announces itself, whether it does so explicitly or not, and whether it is understood or not. Entangled being-together-with innerworldly things at hand taken care of is essentially included in being-ahead-of-oneself-already-being-in-the-world.
The formal existential totality of the ontological structural whole of Dasein must thus be formulated in the following structure: the being of Dasein means being-ahead-of-oneself-already-in (the world) as being-together-with (innerworldly beings encountered). This being fills in the significance of the term care, which is used in a purely ontological and existential way. Any ontically intended tendency of being, such as worry or carefreeness, is ruled out.
[193] Since being-in-the-world is essentially care, being-together-with things at hand could be taken in our previous analyses as taking care of them, while being with the Dasein-with of others encountered within the world could be taken as concern. Being-together-with is taking care, because as a mode of being-in it is determined by its fundamental structure, care. Care not only characterizes existentiality, abstracted from facticity and falling prey, but encompasses the unity of these determinations of being. Nor does care mean primarily and exclusively an isolated attitude of the ego toward itself. The expression "care for oneself," following the analogy of taking care and concern, would be a tautology. Care cannot mean a special attitude toward the self, because the self is already characterized ontologically as being-ahead-of-itself; but in this determination the other two structural moments of care, already-being-in ... and being-together-with, are co-posited [mitgesetzt].
In being-ahead-of-oneself as the being toward one's owrmost potentiality-of-being lies the existential and ontological condition of the possibility of being free for authentic existentiell possibilities. It is the potentiality-for-being for the sake of which Dasein always is as it factically is. But since this being toward the potentiality-for-being is itself determined by freedom, Dasein can also be related to its possibilities unwillingly, it can be inauthentic and factically it is this initially and for