"dedication." Thus Seneca writes in his last letter (Ep. 124): "Of the four existing natures (tree, animal, human being, God), the last two, which alone are endowed with reason, are distinguished in that God is immortal, human being mortal. The good of the One, namely of God, is fulfilled by its nature; but that of the other, human being, is fulfilled by care (cura): unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis."
The perfectio of human being-becoming what one can be in being free for one's ownmost possibilities (project)-is an "accomplishment" of " care." But, equiprimordially, care determines the fundamental mode of this being according to which it is delivered over (thrownness) to the world taken care of. The "ambiguity" of "care" refers to a single basic constitution in its essentially twofold structure of thrown project.
As compared with the ontic interpretation, the existential and ontological interpretation is not only a theoretical and ontic generalization. That would only signify that ontically all the human being's behavior is "full of care" and guided by his "dedication" to something. The "generalization" is an a priori-ontological one. It does not refer to ontic qualities that constantly keep emerging, but to a constitution of being which always already is taken as a basis. This constitution first makes it ontologically possible that this being can be addressed ontically as cura. The existential condition of the possibility of "the cares of life" and "dedication" must be conceived in a primordial, that is, ontological sense as care.
The transcendental "universality" of the phenomenon of care and [200] all fundamental existentials has, on the other hand, that broad scope through which the basis is given on which every ontic :interpretation of Dasein with a worldview moves, whether it understands Dasein as "the cares of life" and need, or in an opposite manner.
The "emptiness" and "generality" of the existential structures which obtrude themselves ontically have their own ontological definiteness and fullness. The whole of the constitution of Dasein itself is not simple in its unity, but shows a structural articulation which is expressed in the existential concept of care.
Om ontological interpretation of Dasein has brought the preontological self-interpretation of this being as "care" to the existential concept of care. The analytic of Dasein does not aim, however, at an ontological basis for anthropology; it has a fundamental, ontological goal. This goal has tacitly determined the course of our considerations, our choice of phenomena, and the limits to which our analysis may penetrate. With regard to our leading question of the meaning of being and its development, our inquiry must now, however, explicitly secure what has been gained so far. But something like this cannot be attained by an external synopsis of what has been discussed. Rather, what could