of reality among others, and on the other hand the already disclosed world is necessarily presupposed for resistance. Resistance characterizes the "external world" in the sense of innerworldly beings, but never in the sense of world. "Consciousness of reality" is itself a way of being-in-the-world. Every "problematic of the external world" necessarily goes back to this basic existential phenomenon.
If the "cogito sum" is to serve as the point of deparlure for the existential analytic, we not only need to tum it around, but we need a new ontological and phenomenal confumation of its content. Then the first statement is "sum," in the sense of I-am-in-a-world. As such a being, "I am" ["bin ich"] in the possibility of being toward various modes of behavior (cogitationes) as ways of being together with innerworldly beings. In contrast, Descartes says that cogitationes are indeed objectively present and an ego is also objectively present as a worldless res cogitans.
(c) Reality and Care
AB an ontological term, reality is related to innerworldly beings. If it serves to designate this kind of being in general, then handiness and objective presence function as modes of reality. But if one lets this world keep its traditional" meaning, it means being in the sense of the sheer objective presence of things. But not all objective presence is the objective presence of things. "Nature," which "surrounds" us, is indeed an innerworldly being, but it shows neither the kind of being of handiness, nor of objective presence as "natural things." In whatever way one interprets this being of "nature," all modes of being of innerworldly beings are ontologically founded in the worldliness of the world, and thus in the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. From this there arises the insight that neither does reality have priority within the modes of being of innerworldly beings, nor can this mode of being even characterize something like world and Dasein in an ontologically adequate way.
Reality is referred back to the phenomenon of care in the order of ontological foundational contexts and possible categorial and existential demonstration. The fact that reality is ontologically grounded in [212] the being of Dasein cannot mean that something real can only be what it is in itself when and as long as Dasein exists.
However, only as long as Dasein is, that is, as long as there is the on tic possibility of an understanding of being, "is there" [gibt es] being [Sein]. If Dasein does not exist, then there "is" no "independence" either, nor "is" there an "in itself." Such matters are then neither
* Prevalent today.