follow what showed itself in itself. In another passage he says: ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκαζόμενοι,24 compelled by "truth" itself, they carried out their investigations. Aristotle designates this inquiry as cptA.ocrocpav περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας,25 "philosophizing" about the "truth" or even as ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας,26 as demonstrating something and letting it be seen with regard to the "truth" and in the scope of "truth." Philosophy itself is defined as ἐπιστήμη τις τῆς ἀληθείας27 the science of "truth." But at the same time it is characterized as an ἐπιστήμη, ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν,28 as the science that considers beings as beings, that is, with regard to their being [Sein].
What does it mean to speak of "inquiring into 'truth,'" or the science of "truth"? Is "truth" made thematic in this inquiry in the sense of a theory of knowledge or of judgment? Obviously not, for "truth" means the same thing as the "matter" ["Sache"], "what shows itself." But then what does the expression "truth" mean if it can be used as a term for "beings" ["Seiendes"] and "being" ["Sein"]?
But if truth rightfully has a primordial connection with being, then the phenomenon of truth moves into the orbit" of the problematic of fundamental ontology. But must not this phenomenon have been encountered already within our preparatory fundamental analysis, the analytic of Dasein? What ontic-ontological connection does "truth" have with Dasein and with its ontic characteristic which we call the understanding of being? Can the reason why being necessarily goes together with truth and vice versa be pointed out in terms of this understanding?
These questions cannot be avoided. Because being in fact does "go together" with truth, the phenomenon of truth has already been one of the themes of our earlier analysis, although not explicitly under this name. Now we must explicitly delimit the phenomenon of truth, giving precision to the problem of being and pinpointing the problems contained therein. In doing this, we shall not simply summarize what we have said [214] previously. The investigation takes a new point of departure.†
Our analysis starts from (a) the traditional concept of truth and attempts to lay bare its ontological foundations. In terms of these foundations the primordial phenomenon of truth becomes visible. On the basis of this, (b) the derivative character [Abkünftigkeit] of the traditional
* Not only, but into the middle.
† This is the real place to begin the leap into Da-sein.
24. Ibid., 984b10.
25. Ibid., A, 983b2, cf. 988a20.
26. Ibid., 993b17.
27. Ibid., 993b20.
28. Ibid., 1003a21.