constantly in each and every attunement. Attunement brings Dasein, more or less explicitly and authentically, before its "that it is, and as the being that it is, has to be as a potentiality-of-being." But for the most part, mood closes off thrownness. Dasein flees from thrownness to the relief that comes with the supposed freedom of the they-self. We characterized this flight as a fleeing in the face of the uncanniness that fundamentally determines individualized being-in-the-world. Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the fundamental attunement of anxiety, and, as the most elemental disclosedness of thrown Dasein, it confronts being-in-the-world with the nothingness of the world about which it is anxious in the anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-of-being. What if Dasein, finding itself in the ground of its uncanniness, were the caller of the call of conscience?
Nothing speaks against this; but all the phenomena that were set forth up to now in characterizing the caller and its calling speak for it.
In its who, the caller is definable by nothing [nichts] "worldly." It is Dasein in its uncanniness, primordially thrown being-in-the-world, as [277] not-at-home, the naked "that" in the nothingness [Nichts] of the world. The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice. What could be more p]ien to the they, lost in the manifold "world" of its heedfulness, than the self individualized to itself in uncanniness thrown into nothingness? "It" calls, and yet gives the heedfully curious ears nothing to hear that could be passed along and publicly spoken about. But what should Dasein even report from the uncanniness of its thrown being? What else remains for it than its own potentiality-ofbeing revealed in anxiety? How else should it call than by summoning to this potentiality-of-being about which it is solely concerned?
The call does not report any facts; it calls without uttering anything. The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence. And it does this only because in calling the one summoned, it does not call him into the public idle chatter of the they, but calls him back from that to the reticence of his existent potentiality-of-being. When the caller reaches one who is summoned, it does so with a cold assurance that is uncanny and by no means obvious. Wherein lies the basis for this assurance, if not in the fact that Dasein, individualized to itself in its uncanniness, is absolutely unmistakable to itself? What is it that takes away from Dasein so radically the possibility of misunderstanding itself from some other direction and failing to recognize itself, if not the abandonment [Verlassenheit] in being delivered over [Überlassenheit] to itself?
Uncanniness is the fundamental kind of being-in-the-world, although it is covered over in everydayness. Dasein itself calls as conscience from the ground of this being. The "it calls me" is an eminent kind of discourse of Dasein. The call attuned by anxiety first makes