312 II. III
Being and Time

the term temporality. We must now keep the terminological use of this expression at a distance from all of the meanings of "future," "past," and "present" initially urging themselves upon us from the vulgar concept of time. That is also true of the concepts of a "subjective" and an "objective," or an "immanent" and "transcendent" "time." Since Dasein understands itself initially and for the most part inauthentically, we may suppose that the "time" of the vulgar understanding of time indeed presents a genuine phenomenon, but a derivative one. It arises from inauthentic temporality that has an origin of its own. The concepts of "future," "past," and "present" initially grew out of the [327] inauthentic understanding of time. The terminological definition of the corresponding primordial and authentic phenomena battles with the same difficulty in which all ontological terminology is stuck. In this field of inquiry, forcing things is not an arbitrary matter, but a necessity rooted in facts. However, in order to demonstrate seamlessly the origin of inauthentic temporality from primordial and authentic temporality, we first need to work out the primordial phenomenon concretely, which we have thus far only sketched out roughly.

If resoluteness constitutes the mode of authentic care, and if it is itself possible only through temporality, the phenomenon at which we arrived by considering resoluteness must itself only present a modality of temporality, which makes care possible in general. The wholeness of the being of Dasein as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being-together-with (beings encountered within the world). When we first established this articulated structure, we referred to the fact that with regard to this articulation the ontological question had to be taken back further to the exposition of the unity of the wholeness of the structural manifold.23 The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality.

Being-ahead-of-oneself is grounded in the future. Already-being-in ... makes known having-been. Being-together-with ... is made possible in making present. After what we have said, it is automatically ruled ·out to conceive the "ahead" in the "ahead-of-itself" and the "already" in terms of the vulgar understanding of time. The "ahead" does not mean the "before" in the sense of a "not-yet-now, but later." Nor does the "already" mean a "no-longer-now, but earlier." If the expressions "ahead of" and "already" had this temporal meaning, which they can also have, then we would be saying about the temporality of care that it is something that is "earlier" and "later," "not yet'' and "no longer" at the same time. Then care would be conceived as a being that occurs and elapses "in time." The being of a being having the character of Dasein would then tum into something objectively present. If something like

23. Cf. § 41.

Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)