329 II. IV
Being and Time

Yet neither of these moods, fear and anxiety, ever "occurs," just isolated in the "stream of experience," but always attunes an understanding or is attuned by it. Fear is occasioned by beings taken care of in the surrounding world. In contrast, anxiety axises from Dasein itseli. Fear comes over us from innerworldly beings. Anxiety axises from being-in-the-world as thrown being-toward-death. Understood temporally, this "arising" of anxiety from Dasein means that the future and the present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial having-been in the sense of bringing us back to the possibility of repetition. But anxiety can arise authentically only in a resolute Dasein. One who is resolute knows no fear, but understands the possibility of anxiety as the mood that does not hinder and confuse him. Anxiety frees one from "nullifying" ["nichtigen"] possibilities and lets one become free for authentic possibilities.

Although both modes of attunement, fear and anxiety, are primarily grounded in having-been, their origin is different with regard to the temporalizing belonging to each in the totality of care. Anxiety [345] arises from the future of resoluteness, while fear arises from the lost present of which fear is fearfully apprehensive, thus falling prey to it more than ever.

But is not the thesis of the temporality of moods perhaps valid only for the phenomena that we selected? How is a temporal meaning to be found in the pallid lack of mood that dominates the "grey everyday"? And how about the temporality of moods and affects such as hope, joy, enthusiasm, and gaiety? As soon as we mention phenomena such as weariness [Überdruß], sadness, melancholy, and despair, it becomes clear that not only fear and anxiety are founded existentially in having-been, but that other moods are as well. However, these must be interpreted on the broader basis of a developed existential analytic of Dasein. But even such a phenomenon as hope, which seems to be completely founded in the future, must be analyzed in a way similar to fear. In contrast to fear which is related to a malum futurum, hope has been characterized as the expectation of a bonum futurum. But what is decisive for the structure of hope as a phenomenon is not so much the "futural" character of that to which it is related as the existential meaning of hoping itself. Here, too, the mood character lies primarily in hoping as hoping something Jot oneself. One who hopes takes oneself, so to speak, along in the hope and brings oneself toward what is hoped for. But that presupposes having-achieved-oneself. The fact that hope brings relief from depressing apprehensiveness only means that even this attunement remains related to a burden in the mode of having-been. Elevated or elevating moods are ontologically possible only in an ecstatic-temporal relation of Dasein to the thrown ground of itself.


Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)