concept of sight, "seeing" is not limited to perceiving with the "physical eyes." Perceiving [Vernehmen] in the broader sense lets what is at hand and present [Vorhanden] be "bodily" encountered with regard to their outward appearance. This letting something be encountered is grounded in a present [Gegenwart]. This present provides the ecstatic horizon in general within which being can be bodily present [anwesend]. Curiosity, however, does not make present what is objectively present in order to understand it by lingering with it, but it seeks to see only in order to see and have seen. As this making present that gets tangled up in itself, curiosity has an ecstatic unity with a corresponding future and having-been. Greed for the new indeed penetrates to something not [347] yet seen, but in such a way that making present attempts to withdraw from awaiting. Curiosity is altogether inauthentically futural, in such a way that it does not await a possibility, but in its greed only desires possibility as something real. Curiosity is constituted by a dispersed making present that, only making present, thus constantly tries to run away from the awaiting in which it is nevertheless "held," although in a dispersed way. The present "arises" from ["entspringt"] the awaiting that belongs to it in the sense of running away from it that we emphasized. But the making present of curiosity that "arises" is so little interested in the "matter in question" that, as soon as it catches sight of it, it already is looking for the next thing. The making present that "arises" from the awaiting of a definite, grasped possibility makes possible ontologically the not-lingering that is distinctive of curiosity. Making present does not "arise" from awaiting in such a way that it, so to speak, disengages itself from awaiting and leaves it to itself, ontically understood. "Arising" is an ecstatic modification of awaiting in such a way that awaiting pursues [nachspringt] making present. Awaiting gives itself up, so to speak; it no longer lets inauthentic possibilities of taking care come toward it from what is taken care of, unless they serve the purpose of an impatient making present. When awaiting is ecstatically modified by a making present that no longer arises, but pursues, this modification is the existential and temporal condition of the possibility of distraction.
Making present is left more and more to itself as it is modified by the awaiting that pursues. It makes present for the sake of the present. Thus tangled up in itself, the dispersed not-lingering turns into never dwelling anywhere [Aufenthaltlosigkeit]. This mode of the present is the most extreme opposite phenomenon to the Moment. In this never dwelling anywhere Da-sein is everywhere and nowhere. The Moment brings existence to the situation and discloses the authentic "there."
The more inauthentic the present is, that is, the more making present comes to "itself," the more it flees from a definite potentiality-of-being and closes it off. But then the future can hardly come back