start with this retention and bring it explicitly nearer in its reference to the what-for. The deliberation that brings near must, in the scheme of making present, adapt itself to the kind of being of what is to be brought near. The character of relevance of what is at hand is not first discovered by deliberation, but only gets brought near by it in such a way that it circumspectly lets that through which something is in relevance be seen as this.
The way the present is rooted in the future and in the having-been is the existential and temporal condition of the possibility that what is projected in circumspect understanding can be brought nearer in a making present in such a way that the present must adapt itself to what is encountered in the horizon of awaiting retention; that is, it must interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure. This answers our earlier question whether the as-structure is existentially and ontologically connected21 with the phenomenon of projecting. Like understanding and interpretation in general, the "as" is grounded in the ecstatic and horizonal unity of temporality. In our fundamental analysis of being, and indeed in connection with the interpretation of the "is" (which as a copula "expresses" the addressing of something as something), we must again make the as-phenomenon thematic and define the concept of the "schema" existentially.
However, what is the temporal characterization of circumspect deliberation and its schemata supposed to contribute to answering our current question of the genesis of the theoretical mode of behavior? Only enough to clarify the situation of Dasein in which a circumspect taking care changes over into theoretical discovery. We may then try to analyze this transformation itself following the guideline of an elemental statement of circumspect deliberation and its possible modifications.
In our circumspect use of tools, we can say that the hammer is too heavy or too light. Even the sentence that the hammer is heavy can express a heedful deliberation and mean that it is not light, that is, that it requires force to use it or it makes using it difficult. But the statement can also mean that the being before us, with which we are circumspectly familiar as a hammer, has a weight, namely, the "property" [361] of heaviness. It exerts a pressure on what lies beneath it, and when that is removed, it falls. The discourse understood in this way is no longer in the horizon of the awaiting retention of a totality of useful things and its relations of relevance. What is said has been drawn from looking at what is appropriate for a being with "mass." What is now in view is appropriate for the hammer, not as a tool, but as a corporeal thing that is subject to the law of gravity. Circumspect talk about being "too heavy" or "too light" no longer has any "meaning";
21. Cf.§ 32.