358 II. V
Being and Time

of life," that is, of the specific way of stretching along, movement, and persistence of Dasem, must accorclingly be approached in the horizon [375] of the temporal constitution of this being. The movement of existence is not the motion of something objectively present. It is determined from the stretching along of Dasem. The specific movement of the stretched out stretching itself along, we call the occurrence [Geschehen] of Dasein. The question of the "connectedness" of Dasein is the ontological problem of its occurrence. To expose the structure of occurrence and the existential and temporal conditions of its possibility means to gain an ontological understanding of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit].

With the analysis of the specific movement and persistence appropriate to the occurrence of Dasein, our inquiry returns to the problem that was touched upon right before the exposition of temporality: to the question of the constancy of the self that we determined as the who of Dasein.1 Self-constancy is a mode of being of Dasein and is thus grounded in a specific temporalizing of temporality. The analysis of occurrence introduces the problems found in a thematic investigation into temporalization as such.

If the question of historicity leads back to those "origins," then the place of the problem of history has thus already been decided upon. We must not search in historiography as the science of history. Even if the scientific and theoretical kind of treatment of the problem of ''history" does not just aim at an "epistemological" (Simmel) clarification of historiographical comprehension, or at the logic of the concept formation of historiographical presentation (Rickert), but is rather oriented toward the "objective side," history is still only accessible in this line of questioning as the object of a science. The basic phenomenon of history, which is prior to and underlies the possibility of making something thematic by historiography, is thus irrevocably set aside. How history can become a possible object for historiography can be gathered only from the kind of being of what is historical, from historicity and its rootedness in temporality.

If historicity itself is to be illuminated in terms of temporality, and primordially in terms of authentic temporality, then it is essential to this task that it can only be carried out by structuring it phenomenologically.*2 [376] The existential and ontological constitution of historicity must be mastered in opposition to the vulgar interpretation of the history of Dasein that covers over. The existential construction of historicity has its definite supports in the vulgar understancling of Dasein and is guided by those existential structures attained so far.

* Project.

1. Cf. § 64.

2. Cf. § 63.

Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)