359 II. V
Being and Time

We shall first describe the vulgar concept of history, so that we may give our investigation an orientation as to the factors which are generally held to be essential for history. Here it must become clear what is primordially considered as historical. Thus the entry point for the exposition of the ontological problem of historicity has been designated.

Our interpretation of the authentic potentiality-of-being-whole of Dasein and our analysis of care as temporality arising from that interpretation offer the guideline for the existential construction of historicity. The existential project for the historicity of Dasein only reveals what already lies enveloped in the temporalizing of temporality. Corresponding to the rootedness of historicity in care, Dasein always exists as authentically or inauthentically historical. What we had in view under the rubric of everydayness. for the existential analytic of Dasein as the closest horizon gets clarified as the inauthentic historicity of Dasein.

Disclosure and interpretation belong essentially to the occurrence of Dasein. From the kind of being of this being that exists historically, there arises the existentiell possibility of an explicit disclosure and conception of history. Making it thematic, that is, the historiographical disclosure of history, is the presupposition for the possibility of "the foundation of the historical world in the human sciences." The existential interpretation of historiography as a science aims solely at a demonstration of its ontological provenance from the historicity of Dasein. Only from here are the boundaries to be staked out within which a. theory of science oriented toward the factical workings of science may expose itself to the chance elements of its line of questioning.

The analysis of the historicity of Dasein attempted to show that this being is not "temporal" because it "is in history," but that, on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being.

Nevertheless, Dasein must also be called "temporal" in the sense of its being "in time." Factical Dasein needs and uses the calendar and the clock even without a developed historiography. What occurs "with it," it experiences as occurring "in time." In the same way, the [377] processes of nature, whether living or lifeless, are encountered "in time." They are within-time. So while our analysis of how the "time" of within-time-ness has its source in temporality will be deferred until the next chapter,3 it would be easy to put this before the discussion of the connection between historicity and temporality. What is historical is ordinarily characterized with the aid of the time of withintime- ness. But if this vulgar characterization is to be stripped of its seeming self-evidence and exclusiveness, historicity is to be "deduced" beforehand purely from the primordial temporality of Dasein. This


3. Cf. § 80.


Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)