364 II. V
Being and Time

authentically historical. However, the "temporal" distance from now [382] and today has no primarily constitutive significance for the historicity of authentically historical beings, not because they are not "in time" or are timeless, but rather because they primordially exist temporally in a way that nothing objectively present "in time," whether passing away or coming into being, could ever, by its ontological essence, be temporal in such a way.

It will be said that these are overly complicated remarks. No one denies that human existence is basically the primary "subject" of history, and the vulgar concept of history cited says this clearly enough. But the thesis that "Dasein is historical" not only refers to the ontic fact that human being represents a more or less important "atom" in the mechanism of world history, and remains the plaything of circumstances and events, but poses the problem why, and on the basis of what ontological conditions, does historicity belong to the subjectivity of the "historical" subject as its essential constitution?

§ 74. The Essential Constitution of Historicity

Factically, Dasein always has its "history," and it can have something of the sort because the being of this being is constituted by historicity. We want to justify this thesis with the intention of setting forth the ontological problem of history as an existential one. The being of Dasein was defined as care. Care is grounded in temporality. Within the scope of temporality we must accordingly search for an occurrence that determines existence as historical. Thus the interpretation of the historicity of Dasein turns out to be basically just a more concrete elaboration of temporality. We revealed temporality initially with regard to the mode of authentic existing that we characterized as anticipatory resolution. To what extent does this involve an authentic occurrence of Dasein?

We determined resoluteness as self-projection upon one's own being guilty4 that is reticent and ready for anxiety. It attains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness.5 In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-of-being in a way that confronts death in order to take over completely the being [Seiende] that it itself is in its thrownness. Resolutely taking over one's own factical "there" implies [383] at the same time resolve in the situation. In the existential analytic we cannot, on principle, discuss what Dasein factically resolves upon. Our present inquiry excludes even the existential project of factical possibilities of existence. Nevertheless, we must ask whence in general can the possibilities be drawn upon which Dasein factically projects

4. Cf. § 60.

5. Cf. § 62.

Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)