365 II. V
Being and Time

itself? Anticipatory self-projection upon the insuperable possibility of existence—death—guarantees only the totality and authenticity of resoluteness. But the factically disclosed possibilities of existence are not to be learned from death. All the less so since anticipation of that possibility is not a speculation about it, but rather precisely means coming back to the factical there. Is taking over the thrownness of the self into its world supposed to disclose a horizon from which existence seizes its factical possibilities? Did we not moreover say that Dasein never gets behind its thrownness?6 Before we rashly decide whether Dasein ·draws its authentic possibilities of existence from thrownness or not, we must assure ourselves that we have a complete conception of this fundamental determination of care.

To be sure, as thrown, Dasein is delivered over to itself and its potentiality-of-being, but as being-in-the-world. As thrown, it is dependent upon a "world," and exists factically with others. Initially and for the most part, the self is lost in the they. It understands itself in terms of the possibilities of existence that "circulate" in the present day "average" public interpretedness of Dasein. Mostly these possibilities are made unrecognizable by ambiguity, but they are still familiar. Authentic existentiell understanding is so far from extricating itself from traditional interpretedness that it always seizes its chosen possibility in resolution from out of and in opposition to that interpretedness, and yet again for it.

The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself discloses the actual factical possibilities of authentic existing in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness takes over as thrown. Resolute coming back to thrownness involves handing oneself over to traditional possibilities, although not necessarily as traditional ones. If everything "good" is a matter of heritage and if the character of "goodness" lies in making authentic existence possible, then handing down a heritage is always constituted in resoluteness. The more authentically Dasein resolves [384] itself, that is, understands itself unambiguously in terms of its ownmost eminent possibility in anticipating death, the more unequivocal and the less haphazard is the choice in finding the possibility of its existence. Only the anticipation of death drives every random and "preliminary" possibility out. Only being free for death gives Dasein its absolute goal and pushes existence into its finitude. The finitude of existence thus seized upon tears one back out of endless multiplicity of closest possibilities offering themselves—those of comfort, shirking and taking things easy—and brings Dasein to the simplicity of its fate [Schicksals]. This is how we designate the primordial occurrence of Dasein that lies in authentic resoluteness in which it hands itself

6. Cf.§ 58.

Martin Heidegger (GA 2) Being & Time (S&S)