370 II. V
Being and Time

historical as a countryside, as areas that have been. inhabited or exploited, as battlefields and cultic sites. These innerworldly beings as such are historical, and their history does not signify something "external" that simply accompanies the "inner" history of the "soul." We shall call these beings world-historical. Here we must note that the expression "world history" that we have chosen, and that is here understood ontologically, has a double meaning. On the one hand, it signifies the occurrence of world in its essential existent [existenten] unity with Dasein. But at the same time it means the innerworldly "occurrence" of what is at hand and objectively present, since innerworldly beings are always discovered with the factically existent world. The historical world is factically only as the world of innerworldly beings. What "occurs" with tools and works as such has its own character of motion, and this character has been completely obscure up to now. For example, a ring that is "presented" and "worn" does not simply undergo a change of location in its being. The movement of occurrence in which "something happens to it" cannot be grasped at all in terms of motion as change of location. That is true of all world-historical "processes" and events, and in a way even of "natural catastrophes." Quite apart from the fact that we would necessarily go beyond the limits of our theme if we were to pursue the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical occurrence, we cannot do this because the intention of this exposition is to lead us to the ontological enigma of the movement of occurrence in general.

We only want to delimit that range of phenomena that we also necessarily have in mind ontologically when we speak about the historicity of Dasein. On the basis of the temporally founded transcendence of the world, what is world-historical is always already "objectively" there in the occurrence of existing being-in-the-world, without being grasped historiographically. And since factical Dasein is absorbed and entangled in what it takes care of, it initially understands its history as world history. And since, furthermore, the vulgar understanding of being understands "being" as objective presence without further differentiation, the being of what is world-historical is experienced and interpreted in the sense of objective presence that arrives, is present, and disappears. And finally since the meaning of being in general is taken to be what is absolutely self-evident, the question of the kind of being of what is world-historical and of the movement of occurrence in general is "after all really" only unfruitful and unnecessarily complicated verbal sophistry.

Everyday Dasein is dispersed in the multiplicity of what "happens" daily. The opportunities and circumstances that taking care keeps "tactically" awaiting in advance result in "fate." Inauthentically existing Dasein first calculates its history in terms of what it takes care of. In so doing, it is driven about by its "affairs." So if Dasein wants to