come to itself, it must first pull itself together [Zusammenholen] from the dispersion and the disconnectedness of what has just "happened," and, because of this, there at last arises from the horizon of the understanding of inauthentic historicity the question of how one is to establish Dasein's "connectedness" in the sense of the experiences of the subject which are "also" present. The possibility that this horizon for the question should be the dominant one is grounded in irresoluteness that constitutes the essence of the in-constancy of the self.
We have thus pointed out the origin of the question of Dasein' s "connectedness" in the sense of the unity with which experiences are linked together between birth and death. At the same time, the provenance of this question betrays its inappropriateness -with regard to a primordial existential interpretation of the totality of occurrence of Dasein. But, on the other hand, with the predominance of this "natural" horizon of questioning, it becomes explicable why precisely the authentic historicity of Dasein—fate and repetition—looks as if it, least of all, could provide the phenomenal basis for bringing into the form of an ontologically founded problem what is basically intended with the question of the "connectedness of life."
This question cannot ask: how does Dasein acquire such a unity of connection [Zusammenhang] so that it can subsequently link together the succession of "experiences" that has ensued and is still ensuing; rather, it asks in which of its own kinds of being does it lose itself in such a way that it must, as it were, pull itself together only subsequently out of its dispersion, and invent [erdenken] for itself a unity in which this together [Zusammen] is embraced? Lostness in the they and in world history revealed itself earlier as a flight from death. This flight from ... reveals being-toward-death as a fundamental determination of care. Anticipatory resoluteness brings this being-toward-death to authentic existence. But we interpreted the occurrence of this resoluteness, which anticipates and hands down and repeats the heritage of possibilities as authentic historicity. Does perhaps the primordial stretching along of the whole of existence, which is not lost and does not need a connection, lie in historicity? The resoluteness of the self against the inconstancy of dispersion is in itself a steadiness that has been stretched along —the steadiness in which Dasein as fate "incorporates" into its existence birth and death and their ''between" in such a way  that in such constancy it is in the Moment for what is world-historical in its actual situation. In the fateful repetition of possibilities that have-been, Dasein brings itself back "immediately," that is, temporally and ecstatically, to what has already been before it. But then, when its heritage is thus handed down to itself, ''birth," in coming back from the insuperable possibility of death, is taken into existence, so that existence may accept the thrownness of its own there freer from illusion.