Resoluteness constitutes the fidelity of existence to its own self. As resoluteness ready for anxiety, fidelity is at the same time a possible reverence for the sole authority that a free existence can have, for the possibilities of existence that can be repeated. Resoluteness would be misunderstood ontologically if one thought that it is real as "experience" only as long as the "act" of resolution "lasts." In resoluteness lies the existentiell constancy which, in keeping with its essence, has already anticipated [ vorweggenommen] every possible Moment arising from it. As fate, resoluteness is freedom to give up a definite resolution, as may be required in the situation. Thus the constancy of existence is not interrupted, but precisely confirmed in the Moment. Constancy is not first formed either through or by "Moments" adjoining each other, but rather the Moments arise from the temporality, already stretched along, of that repetition which is futurally in the process of having-been.
On the other hand, in inauthentic historicity the primordial stretching along of fate is concealed. With the inconstancy of the they-self, Dasein makes present its "today." Awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten what is old. The they evades choice. Blind toward possibilities, it is incapable of retrieving what has been, but only retains what is and receives the "real" that has been left over of the world-historical that has been: the remnants, and the information about them that is available. Lost in the making present of the today, it understands the "past" in terms of the "present." In contrast, the temporality of authentic historicity, as the Moment that anticipates and retrieves, undoes the character of making-present of the today and weans one off of the conventions of the they. Inauthentic historical existence, on the other hand, burdened with the legacy of a "past" that has become unrecognizable to it, looks for what is modern. Authentic historicity understands history as the "return" [Wiederkehr"] of what is possible and knows that a possibility returns only when existence is open for it fatefully, in the Moment, in resolute repetition.
The existential interpretation of the historicity of Dasein constantly gets caught up [gerät] unexpectedly in shadows. The obscurities are all the more difficult to dispel when the possible dimensions of appropriate questioning are not disentangled and when everything is haunted by the enigma of being and, as has now become clear, of movement. Nevertheless, we may venture an outline of the ontological genesis of historiography as a science in terms of the historicity of Dasein. It should serve as a preparation for the clarification of the task of a historical destruction of the history of philosophy10 to be carried out in what follows.
10. Cf.§ 6.