making present that does not await but forgets. The irresolute person understands himself in terms of the events and accidents nearest by that are encountered in such making present and urge themselves upon him in changing ways. Busily losing himself in what is taken care of, the irresolute person loses his time in them, too. Hence his characteristic way of talking: "I have no time." Just as the person who exists inauthentically constantly loses time and never "has" any, it is the distinction of the temporality of authentic existence that in resoluteness it never loses time and "always has time." For the temporality of resoluteness has, in regard to its present, the character of the Moment. The Moment's authentic making present of the situation does not itself take the lead, but is maintained in the future that has-been. Existence defined by the Moment [augenblickliche Existenz] temporalizes itself as fatefully whole, stretching along in the sense of the authentic, historical constancy of the self. This kind of temporal existence "constantly" has its time for that which the situation requires of it. But resoluteness discloses the there in this way only as situation. Thus the resolute person can never encounter what is disclosed in such a way that he could lose his time on it in an irresolute way.
Factically thrown Dasein can "take" and lose time for itself only because a "time" is allotted to it as temporality ecstatically stretched along with the disclosedness of the there grounded in that temporality.
As disclosed, Dasein exists factically in the mode of being-with with the others. It keeps itself in a public, average intelligibility. The "now that ..." , "then when ..." interpreted and expressed in everyday being-with-one-another, are understood in principle, although they [411] are unequivocally dated only within limits. In the "nearest" being-with-one-another, several people can say "now" together, and each can date the "now" in a different way: now that this or that happens. The "now" expressed is spoken by each one in the publicness of being-with-one-another-in-the-world. The time interpreted and expressed by any particular Dasein is thus also always already made public as such on the basis of its ecstatic being-in-the-world. Since everyday taking care understands itself in terms of the "world" taken care of, it knows the "time" that it takes for itself not as its own, but rather heedfully exploits the time that "there is," the time with which the they reckons. But the publicness of "time" is all the more compelling the more factical Dasein explicitly takes care of time by expressly taking it into account
§ 80. Time Taken Care of and Within-Timeness
Thus far we have only had to understand how Dasein, grounded in temporality, takes care of time in existing, and how time makes itself public for being-in-the-world in the taking care that interprets. We