to be born, to arise from.4 Nature signifies “that which lets something originate from itself (aus sich entstammen läßt)” (WBP 309). But this connection to coming to be is no longer heard in the modern word “nature,” and nature has come to be understood as a fixed realm that is contrasted with other realms of beings. Thus, nature is understood by contrasting natural beings with beings that belong to a realm above nature, the supernatural. Or else, nature is contrasted to art, or history, or spirit, and so on. In each case, nature seems to be the predominant term in the twofold differentiation, the term from which the other realm is delineated as opposite to it. But, these dichotomies are, in fact, governed by a wider conception of being within which these regions of beings are contrasted. Whenever we address the question of nature, we are also implicitly raising the question of beings as a whole. Finally, the question of the human being’s relationship to nature is at least implicitly relevant in uncovering these relational pairs that determine, by way of contrast, the meaning of nature. For it is the human being who is capable of defining what is on the basis of these delimiting oppositions. So there is an entire web of interconnected and often confused issues that demand our attention.
The dichotomies that Heidegger lists—nature and grace, nature and art, nature and history, nature and spirit—show that in the history of Western thought, “nature” has been understood as an area of beings whose specific character can be determined by differentiating them from other beings. Thus, in contrast to nature, grace is that which is above nature, and the artwork is that which is not natural but made. Or if nature is understood as material, then spirit is nonmaterial. In each case, there is an opposition, a twofold, each side of which is understood in terms of the other. Neither nature nor its contrary can be understood outside of this opposition. The question of what holds this opposition together remains unasked. Further, one needs to ask what nature must be in itself in order for it to be able to stand in a relation to that which opposes it. Each opposition is stated in terms of a not, such that what is held to be different from nature remains determined by it. In all of these dichotomies, Heidegger says, “‘Nature’ is not only an opposing term but essentially takes precedence” (WBP 310). At the basis of the contrast between two realms of beings lies an understanding of φύσις as the being of beings. Heidegger recognizes in Aristotle’s way of laying out the philosophical understanding of φύσις an attentiveness to this originary sense of φύσις as the dichotomous meaning of being in general. When this double sense of φύσις remains unquestioned, the separation of being and beings becomes prominent, resulting in the splintering of philosophy into regional ontologies.
4. The implication that there is an etymological connection between the Latin natura and the Greek root from which genesis and gignomai are formed is borne out by Cornford: “So, too, in Latin na-tura is derived from na of nascor and na-tivitas. In fact, (g)natura is derived from the same root as gi-gno, gi-gnomai. Cf. Met., 1014 b17.” See footnote C, 114 of Aristotle, Physics I, trans. by F. Cornford and P. H. Wicksteed (Cambridge: The Loeb Classical Library, 1970).