182 Conclusion

relations, we have shown that Heidegger’s philosophy is able to welcome all the contradictions in question without falling into logical triviality.

Our interpretation, whether deemed successful or unsuccessful, delivers an original portrait of Heidegger. Such a portrait represents him as a philosopher who decides to challenge what thinkers have taken to be unquestionable, that is, the Principle of Non-Contradiction. Divorcing himself from the Aristotelian idea that such a logical law is the most fundamental of all principles, Heidegger develops an account of Being which transgresses all the good norms of traditional philosophizing and classical logic as well. The reason being that, according to our interpretation, Heidegger welcomes the idea that, pace the Principle of Non-Contradiction, Being is truly inconsistent. If so, at the very heart of every entity, there is a contradiction which cannot be avoided. Whenever we experience entities in relation to their Being, a contradiction shines with such an unusual power that not even the Principle of Non-Contradiction can dim it.

To conclude, we would like to flag a worry which has not been ad-dressed in this book. As we have already discussed in Chapter 4, the late Heidegger believes that, in the Event, the truth of Beyng is finally revealed, that is, Beyng is an entity and, at the same time, Beyng is not an entity. Now, our dialetheic interpretation of Heidegger’s philosophy is implicitly committed to the idea that such a truth is a propositional one. Even though dielatheism is not necessarily committed to any particular theory of truth, dialetheism is somehow bound to propositional truth. Since dialetheism is the philosophical position according to which some contradictions are true and since contradictions are propositions, dialetheism is concerned with that specific kind of truth which is applicable to propositions. In order to see how the worry is generated, it is enough to recall that, according to many interpreters, Heidegger engages with a special kind of truth (i.e. Aletheia) and some Heideggerians understand this special kind of truth as being non-propositional. If so, our interpretation might face some issues because, in defending a dialetheic account of the truth of Beyng, we rely on an account of truth which is not the one Heidegger actually endorses.1

In order to reply to this worry, we should address one of the most difficult topics in Heidegger’s philosophy, that is, his account of truth. Having said that, we strongly believe that this worry can be addressed by analysing Heidegger’s discussion of the relation between propositional truth and Aletheia (see, for instance, Section 44 of Being and Time). A careful examination of such a relation, we deem, can show that the non-propositional truth of Beyng (i.e. Beyng is an entity and, at the same time, Beyng is not an entity) should and, probably, does lead both Heidegger and us to accept that “Beyng is an entity and, at the same time, Beyng is not an entity” is propositionally true as well.