explicitly “once again” because he also grasps the whole throughout each of the preceding six “joinings.” This whole is not the whole of what lies “between” disclosing a being and be-ing’s “enowning-throw” but is the whole as what occurs or transpires when thinking moves away from and returns to be-ing’s “enowning-throw.” (The “whole of “ would imply summing up and concluding, the “whole as” indicates a manner of self-showing and manifesting.) Grasping this whole happens once again, because with “Be-ing” Heidegger returns to the whole as what occurs when thinking moves away from and returns to be-ing’s “enowning-throw.” That is why he has to characterize “Be-ing” as an attempt to grasp the whole once again.
Finally, the experience of returnership provides the actual entry into “Be-ing” since this experience, as we saw, is irrevocably bound to be-ing’s “enowning-throw” as it enters the domain of thinking via “the happening of the turning.” The experience of returnership and the “happening of turning” thus prove to be so profoundly intertwined that we can say that, by unearthing the experience of returnership, Heidegger in Contributions brings to a preliminary completion his thinking of the “turning.”
But “turning” is not an “event” which occurs outside language and which may or may not leave language alone. Be-ing’s swaying, i.e., “turning” is at the same time a turning of and in language. This being the case, it should be understandable why this present attempt deliberately stays with Heidegger’s basic words instead of abandoning them in favor of the language of the tradition which is “more familiar” and “more intelligible.” Precisely because “turning” marks a “turning point” in Heidegger’s thinking of be-ing, and precisely because no one else in our time attempts to articulate the “turning,” it is incumbent upon us to stay with Heidegger’s language. And this is to say that whether we take the “turning” as that to which transcendental-horizonal thinking is a response, or whether we take the “turning” as that to which being-historical thinking is a response, we should stay with Heidegger’s words because they emerge from within the turning as the onefold of being and language. Only insofar as these words emerge from within that onefold are they words “of” thinking and not ours to manipulate as we please. The notion of a more familiar, more intelligible, more traditional language is a notion with which metaphysics attempts to obfuscate Ereignis by interpreting it according to metaphysical criteria of “comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of things.” Such a notion is based on the total lack of grasping what is ownmost to Heidegger’s language and its unfolding within the swaying that is called be-ing. Since “turning” marks a “turning point” in Heidegger’s thinking, then it should be clear why we who come after Heidegger should stay with his words as words that come from and shelter the swaying of be-ing called “turning.”