THE CONCEPT OF TIME
forward; c) why signification is explained through its dissolution in some antecedent reality; d) why this foundational reality is sought in the being of natural objects. So far, our aim in explicating the ontological character of the world has been to provide an initial ontological account of Dasein, calling it clearly to mind and shaking up our view of Dasein with regard to its fundamental character of 'being-in-the-world'.
2. As 'being-in-the-world', Dasein is at the same time being together with others [miteinandersein]. The aim here is not to assert that mostly we do not exist as single persons, that others are also present. Rather, 'being together with others' implies an ontological characteristic of Dasein that is equiprimordial with 'being-in-the-world'. This aspect of Dasein persists even if no one else is actually spoken to or perceived. Since 'being together with others' is equiprimordial with the fundamental characteristic of Dasein as 'being-in-the-world', we must be able to read off the ordinary 'being there' ['Da'] of others (with whom we live in the world) from the manner in which we encounter the surrounding world (as described above). The table over there, with its particular seating arrangements, entails a reference to those whom we dine with on a daily basis; the tool we encounter when we use it was bought at —, mended by —; we received the book from —; the umbrella in the corner was left behind by —. We encounter the things we are concerned with in our dealings with the surrounding world as something that should appear in such and [25] such a light before others, be useful to them, excite, or outdo them. The surrounding world lets us encounter others we are acquainted or familiar with. Others are always already present as those with whom we have to do in our concern whenever concern deals with something in the surrounding world.
But it is not just others that we encounter in this way. We also encounter ourselves [man selbst] in what we do, what we expect, prevent. in the concerns with which we are ongoingly preoccupied. And this encounter with oneself [Sichselbstbegegnen] through the surrounding world occurs in the absence of any egological self-observation or reflection of 'inner' experiences and acts. Ordinarily and for the most part, and as encountered in the world, the others are there [da] as the with-world [Mitwelt], while one's self is there as the self-world [Selbstwelt]. In the most common mode of being there [im nächsten Dasein] one is the world of others and, in this world of others, one is one's own world. This equiprimordial with-worldly and self-worldly articulation must be
18