§2 [7-9]

of beyng is necessary. Such thinking never allows itself to be made into a doctrine. It completely withdraws itself from the fortuitiveness of opinion. But it does issue a directive to the few and to their knowledge, when at issue is the retrieval of humans from the intractability of nonbeings into the tractability of the restrained creation of the site destined for the passing by of the last god.

If the essential occurrence of beyng constitutes the event, however, then how near is the danger that beyng might refuse, and must refuse, to appropriate because humans have become powerless to be Da-sein on account of the untrammeled force of their frenzy for the gigantic, which latter, under the semblance of "greatness," has overpowered them.

Yet if the event becomes a withholding and a refusal, is that only the withdrawal of beyng and the surrendering of beings into nonbeings, or can the refusal (the negativity of beyng) become in the extreme the most remote appropriation-assuming that humans grasp this event and that shock and diffidence place them back in the basic disposition of restraint and thereby already propel them out into Da-sein?

To know the essence of beyng as the event means not only to be aware of the danger of refusal, but also to be prepared for overcoming it. Far in advance of that, what remains first here can only be: to place beyng in question.

No one understands what "I" am here thinking: to let Da-sein arise out of the truth of beyng (i.e., out of the essential occurrence of truth) in order to ground therein beings as a whole and as such and, in the midst of them, to ground the human being.

No one grasps this, because others all try to explain "my" attempt merely historiologically by appealing to the past which they believe I hey understand because it apparently already lies behind them.

As for those who will some day grasp this, they do not need "my" attempt, for they must have paved their own way to it. They must be able to think what is attempted here in such a manner that they believe it comes to them from afar and is nevertheless what is most proper to them, to which they are appropriated as ones who are needed and who therefore have neither the desire nor the opportunity to focus on "themselves."

Through a simple thrust of essential thought, the happening of the truth of beyng must be transposed from the first beginning to the other one, such that in the interplay the wholly other song of beyng resounds.

And therefore what is in effect here throughout is history, which denies itself to historiology, for history does not simply let the past appear but, instead, in all things thrusts over into the future.