12
I. Prospect [11-13]

For the rare, who are endowed with the great courage required for solitude, in order to think the nobility of beyng and to speak of its uniqueness.

Thinking in the other beginning is in a unique way originarily historical: the compliant disposing of the essential occurrence of beyng.

A projection of the essential occurrence of beyng as the event must be ventured, because we do not know that to which our history is assigned. Would that we might radically experience the essential occurrence of this unknown assignment in its self-concealing.

Let us indeed want to develop this knowledge such that what is unknown and given to us as a task might leave our will in solitude and thereby compel the steadfastness of Da-sein to the highest restraint in the face of what is self-concealing.

Nearness to the last god is reticence, which must be set into work and word in the style of restraint.

To be in the nearness of the god—even if this nearness is the most remote remoteness of the undecidability regarding the absconding or advent of the gods—cannot be calculated in terms of "good fortune" or "misfortune." The constancy of beyng itself bears in itself its own measure, if a measure is still needed at all.

To which of us today, however, is this constancy granted? We scarcely manage to be prepared for its necessity or even to point to this preparedness as the inception of another course of history.

Reversions to the all-too-familiar modes of thought and claims of metaphysics will still be disturbing for a long time and will obscure the clarity of the way and the determinateness of the speaking. Nevertheless, the historical moment of the transition must be carried out in the knowledge that all metaphysics (founded on the leading question: what are beings?) remained incapable of transposing the human being into the basic relations to beings. And how should it be capable of that? Even the will to do so finds no hearing as long as the truth of beyng and the uniqueness of beyng have not become needful. Yet how is thinking supposed to succeed in what was previously denied the poet (Hölderlin)? Or must we merely rid his path and his work of the debris covering them and direct them toward the truth of beyng? Are we equipped to do that?

The truth of beyng becomes needful only through the questioners. They are the genuine believers, because they—by opening up the essence of truth—adhere to the ground (cf. The grounding, 237. Belief and truth).

The questioners—alone and without resorting to any magic charm—place the new and highest degree of steadfastness in the middle of beyng, in the essential occurrence of beyng (the event) as the middle.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger