explicitness what originally belongs to restraint. Restraint determines the style of inceptuaP thinking in the other beginning.
Diffidence, in accord with what has been said, is not confused here with shyness or even understood in that direction. Such a view is out of the question, so much so that diffidence as intended here even surpasses the "will" of restraint and does this out of the depth of the ground of the unitary basic disposition. From diffidence in particular arises the necessity of reticence; the latter is what allows an essential occurrence of beyng as event and thoroughly disposes every comportment in the midst of beings and toward beings.
Diffidence is the way of drawing near and remaining near to what is most remote as such (d. The last god). Yet the most remote, in its intimations, provided these are held fast in diffidence, becomes the closest and gathers up into itself all relations of beyng (d. The leap, 115. The disposition guiding the leap).
Yet who is able to let this basic disposition of shocked and diffident restraint resonate in the essential human being? And how many will judge that this disposedness through beyng establishes no turning away from beings? Instead, it establishes the opposite: the opening of the simplicity and greatness of beings and the originally compelled necessity of securing in beings the truth of beyng so as to give the historical human being a goal once again, namely, to become the one who grounds and preserves the truth of beyng, to be the "there" as the ground required by the very essence of beyng, or, in other words, to care. That is what care means, neither a trivial fussing over just anything nor a renunciation of joy and power but something more original than all that, because care is uniquely "for the sake of beyng"—not of the beyng of the human being but of the beyng of beings as a whole.
The directive has often been repeated that "care" is to be thought only in the originary realm of the question of being and not in terms of an arbitrary, personally accidental, "worldview," "anthropological" outlook on the human being. This directive will remain a dead letter in the future as long as those who merely "write" a "critique" of the question of being do not experience, and do not want to experience, anything of the plight of the abandonment by being. For, in the era of a wretchedly flaunted "optimism," the very terms "care" and "abandonment by being" already sound "pessimistic." Now that precisely the dispositions indicated by these names, along with the opposite dispositions, have become radically impossible in the realm of inceptual questioning, since they presuppose thinking in terms of values (ἀγαθόν ["good"]) and also presuppose the previous interpretations of beings
3. Anfänglich, adjectival form of der Anfang ("beginning").—Trans