To think, fully and inventively, this remoteness itself in its essential occurrence as the time-space of the highest decision means to ask about the truth of beyng, about the event itself, from which all future history arises, provided there will still be history.
This remoteness of the undecidability of the outermost and the first is what stands in the clearing on behalf of self-concealment and is the essential occurrence of truth itself as the truth of beyng.
For what is self-concealing of this clearing, the remoteness of the undecidability, is no mere objectively present and irrelevant void but is the essential occurrence of the event as the very essence of the event (of the hesitant self-withholding which, as belonging, already appropriates Da-sein) and is the retention of the moment and of the site of the first decision.
In the essence of the truth of the event, everything true is simultaneously decided and grounded, beings come to be, and nonbeings slip into the semblance of beyng. This remoteness is at once the farthest, and for us the first, nearness to the god but also the plight of the abandonment by being, which is concealed by the lack of a sense of plight evident in the avoidance of meditation today. In the essential occurrence of the truth of beyng, in the event and as the event, the last god is hidden.
The long Christianizing of the god and the increasing promulgation of every attuned relation to beings have, just as obdurately as hiddenly, undermined the preconditions in virtue of which something is situated in the remoteness of the undecidability regarding the absconding or advent of the god, whose essential occurrence nevertheless is most intimately experienced, and this, to be sure, by a knowledge that stands in the truth only by being creative. To create—in the broad sense in which it is intended here—refers to any sheltering of the truth in beings.
When we hear god and gods spoken of, we think, in accord with the kind of representing that has long been customary, in that form which is still indicated most readily by the name "transcendence," a name that certainly is itself already polysemic. Intended is something that surpasses objectively present beings, among them also human beings. Even where particular modes of surpassing and of what surpasses are denied, this way of thinking can itself not be denied. In reference to it, we can even readily survey today's "worldviews":
1. The transcendent (inaccurately also called "transcendence") is the God of Christianity.
2. This "transcendence" is denied and the "people" itself—its essence left rather indeterminate—is put forth as the goal and purpose