who grounds and preserves inasmuch as this being, qua Da-sein, is appropriated by beyng itself, which essentially occurs as nothing other than event.
If, through this dislodging, humans come to stand in the event and remain steadfast there in the truth of beyng, then they still stand first only on the verge of the leap to the decisive experience as to whether in the event the remaining absent or the intrusion of the god decides for humans or against them.
Only if we appreciate how uniquely necessary being is and how it nevertheless does not essentially occur as the god himself, only if we have attuned our essence to these abysses between the human being and beyng and between beyng and the gods, only then do "presuppositions" for a "history" start to become actual again. Consequently, all that matters for thinking is meditation on the "event."
Finally and above all, the "event" can be inventively thought (haled before inceptual thinking) only if beyng itself is conceived as the "between" for the passing by of the last god and for Da-sein.
The event consigns [übereignet] god to the human being by assigning [zueignet] the human being to god. This consigning assignment is the appropriating event [Diese übereignende Zueignung ist Ereignis]; in it, the truth of beyng is grounded as Da-sein (and the human being is transformed, set out into the decision of being-there [Da-sein] and being-away [Weg-sein]), and history takes its other beginning from beyng. The truth of beyng, however, as the openness of the self-concealing, is at the same time transposition into the decision regarding the remoteness and nearness of the gods and so is preparedness for the passing by of the last god.
The event is the "between" in regard to both the passing by of the god and the history of mankind. Yet it is not an irrelevant connecting field. Instead, the relation to the passing by is the opening-needed by the god-of the fissure (cf. The leap, 157 and 158. The fissure and the "modalities"), and the relation to humans is the appropriation that allows to arise the grounding of Da-sein and thus the necessity of sheltering the truth of beyng in beings as a restoration of beings.
The passing by is not history, history is not the event, and the event is not the passing by; yet all three (if we may indeed bring them down to the level of numbers) can be experienced and inventively thought only in their relations, i.e., out of the appropriating event itself.
The remoteness of undecidability is of course not a "beyond," but is what is closest of the still ungrounded "there" of Da-sein, which has become steadfast in preparation for the refusal as the essential occurrence of beyng.